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Kant’s Typo, and the Limits of the Law 
 
Abstract 
 
This dissertation develops a Kantian philosophical framework for 
understanding our individual obligations under public law.  Because we have a 
right to do anything that is not wrong, the best interpretation of Immanuel Kant’s 
Universal Principle of Right tracks the two ways—material and formal—in which 
actions can be wrong.  This interpretation yields surprising insights, most notably 
a novel formulation of Kant’s standard for formal wrongdoing.  Because the 
wrong-making property of a formally wrong action does not depend on whether 
or not the action in question has been prohibited by statute, Kant’s legal 
philosophy is consistent with a natural law theory of public crime.  Moreover, 
because the law can obligate us only by establishing a universal external incentive 
to obey its commands, statutes that impose only fines on nominal violators do 
not constrain our lawful options.  Instead, if they are otherwise just, such statutes 
must be regarded as rightful permissive laws, according to which we may incur 
liabilities through our voluntary choices.
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Introduction 
At first glance, Kant’s political thought can appear bafflingly inconsistent.  
On one hand, Kant holds that political authority is justified exclusively as a 
necessary precondition to our individual freedom.  On the other hand, Kant 
seems at times to embrace a deeply repressive account of state power.  He 
declares that the state’s laws are necessarily consistent with our freedom, and yet 
he insists that we must not resist even the most unbearable injustices perpetrated 
by despotic regimes. 
In the pages that follow, I will attempt to reconcile these seemingly 
conflicting aspects of Kant’s political thought.  Part of the trick involves noticing 
that, for Kant, there is no difference between law and justified political power.  
Kant’s justification for political power is formal—and therefore legal—in nature.  
A formal account of political legitimacy entails a formal account of political 
obligation.  This raises challenging questions about our specific obligations: if our 
obligations do not depend on anyone’s actual intentions or material interests, 
then how can we know definitively what the state has obligated us to do?  I will 
show that our legal obligations are exactly those actions that we are rationally 
required to undertake or refrain from undertaking as a result of the state’s 
legitimate exercise of its coercive power. 
In Chapter 1, I relate Kant’s legal and political philosophy to his moral 
philosophy and describe the basic conceptual apparatus of Kant’s legal and 
political thought.  I begin by offering Arthur Ripstein’s account of the nature of 
the relationship between the Categorical Imperative, Kant’s foundational 
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principle of ethics, and Kant’s Universal Principal of Right, in the context of 
Kant’s account of the relationship between freedom and the moral law in Critique 
of Practical Reason.  I then describe Kant’s conception of external freedom—
independence from constraint by the choice of another person—and explain why 
our freedom necessarily includes acquired rights of property, contract, and 
status.  As Kant understands these rights, they are impossible in the state of 
nature.  I then analyze Kant’s argument that freedom under law is possible 
because state coercion can be thought of as having been authorized by those 
subject to it.  I describe “the idea of the original contract,” which for Kant is the 
regulative principle of the state, and the internal structure of the “three 
authorities” that together constitute it. 
In Chapter 2, I answer the question: how do we know which actions are 
right?  I begin by offering my own interpretation of Kant’s Universal Principle of 
Right, according to which Kant establishes a dual test for the rightness of actions.  
I argue that my interpretation better accords with Kant’s language than do 
alternative readings, according to which Kant establishes a single standard.  My 
interpretation has the further advantage of tracking the two distinct types of 
wrong actions that Kant describes elsewhere: formal wrongs and material 
wrongs.  Because we have a right to do anything that is not wrong, formal and 
material wrongs should exhaust the category of conduct that Universal Principle 
of Right excludes.  Material wrongs are actions that violate the innate or acquired 
rights of another human being.  Formal wrongs are actions that violate “the right 
of human beings as such” to live in a rightful condition.  I draw on Kant’s account 
of the difference between physical opposition and logical opposition in Critique 
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of Pure Reason to explain how material and formal wrongs give rise to different 
kinds of remedies.  Finally, I explain how my analysis of wrongdoing supports my 
argument in favor of a two-standard interpretation of the Universal Principle of 
Right, and I suggest that the meaning of Kant’s principle might be obscured by a 
typographical error. 
In Chapter 3, I argue that the state’s legislative authority is limited to 
enactments that do not logically contradict the concept of a rightful condition.  
Because legislation is a conceptual act, I argue that this limitation affects 
lawmakers as a disability—statutes that contradict the concept of a rightful 
condition simply fail to be laws.  If I am correct, my analysis suggests that the 
state’s criminal lawmaking authority is surprisingly limited—lawmakers can only 
criminalize conduct that is already formally wrong.  Alternative, positivist 
interpretations of Kant’s legal philosophy are mistaken, because they fail to 
attend to the distinction between the state’s legislative authority and its executive 
authority.  I reconcile my view with Kant’s famous opposition to resistance and 
revolution by showing that these activities are inconsistent with the idea of the 
original contract, while mere passive disobedience of unlawful statutes is not 
wrong. 
In Chapter 4, I distinguish permissive law from obligatory law, and I show 
that the state must establish an external incentive for us to comply with the terms 
of any obligatory law.  I then argue that the state’s external incentive must be one 
that we are rationally required to respond to by obeying the law.  Because neither 
civil damages nor monetary fines can establish such a rational requirement, laws 
that impose only fines or damages on violators do not constrain our lawful 
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choices.  I conclude that only criminal punishments can establish legal 
obligations, and that this requirement is really an application of the principle of 
equality under the law. 
It is unfortunate that Kant’s legal and political writings are so inaccessible, 
because his foundational commitments—that political authority is justified solely 
as a prerequisite to individual freedom, and that an individual can be obligated 
only by her own choices—are very appealing.  My attempt to reconcile these 
appealing commitments with Kant’s seemingly authoritarian remarks yields a 
pair of surprising results, which I believe demonstrate the theoretical consistency 
of his approach while simultaneously enhancing its intuitive appeal. 
First, the state’s legislative authority with respect to the imposition of 
criminal sanctions is far more limited than many Kantians believe to be the case.  
Second, the law can only constrain our lawful choices by providing us with an 
external incentive that we are rationally required to respond to by obeying the 
law.  It follows that many common ordinances that appear by their terms to 
impose obligations on us—but which we may intuitively feel little or no obligation 
to obey—do not actually constrain our lawful conduct.  I conclude that Kant’s 
political philosophy is truly a philosophy of freedom. 
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Chapter 1:  Rights, Freedom, and the State 
Kant is best known for his moral philosophy, which grounds moral 
obligation in the concept of freedom of the will.  Kant’s political philosophy 
analogously grounds state authority in the concept of external freedom.  This 
symmetry suggests an intimate relationship between Kant’s moral and political 
principles, but the exact nature of that relationship is disputed.  Because this 
project seeks to determine the manner in which public laws obligate individuals, 
a preliminary answer to this question is essential.  In the first section of this 
chapter, I will explain Arthur Ripstein’s account of this relationship in his recent 
book, Force and Freedom, in the context of Kant’s argument in Critique of 
Practical Reason that it is a practical necessity for rational beings to act in 
accordance with the Categorical Imperative.  I will adopt Ripstein’s account of the 
relationship between Kant’s moral and political thought as a working hypothesis 
in order to explore more specific questions about the nature of our obligations 
under public laws. 
I next offer a taxonomy of our individual rights as Kant understood them.  
Every individual, Kant argues, has an innate right to freedom—independence 
from being constrained by the choice of another—insofar as it can coexist with 
the freedom of all under a universal law.  Because human beings coexist in a 
world full of objects that they can use, a condition of equal freedom is impossible 
without a system of acquired rights defined by the three ancient categories of 
property, contract, and status.  Rights, as Kant conceived of them, are impossible 
in the state of nature, because essential features of the concept of a right—
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reciprocity, objectivity, and assurance—presuppose the existence of a state.  The 
state’s coercive powers can therefore be justified as a necessary precondition to 
our freedom.  The three authorities that a state must have in order to secure our 
freedom are collectively called “idea of the original contract.” 
What is Right? 
The word “right” (recht, or Recht), as it is used in Kant’s political writings, 
has at least three closely related meanings.1  First, “right” is an adjective denoting 
a property of a certain set of actions: “right actions.”  Second, “right” is a noun 
used to refer to an individual entitlement to engage in some action without 
interference, for example, “a right to practice my religion.”  Finally, “right” can 
refer to a system of justice as a whole.  What follows is a brief description of these 
three senses of “right,” and of the relationships between them. 
Kant’s Universal Principle of Right uses “right” in the first sense, to denote 
a property of actions:  
Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone’s freedom 
in accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the 
freedom of choice of each can coexist with everyone’s 
freedom in accordance with a universal law.2   
If my action is right by this standard, Kant argues, then “whoever hinders 
me in it does me wrong; for this hindrance (resistance) cannot coexist with 
                                                   
1 I am grateful to Daniel Viehoff for advice regarding German grammatical 
conventions.  Any remaining errors are my own. 
2 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 24.  (hereafter Metaphysics of Morals)  As 
is customary, I give page references to the Prussian Academy pagination (Ak. 
6:230), for all of Kant’s works in addition to the cited translation. 
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freedom in accordance with a universal law.”3  Kant therefore believed that we 
each have a right (in the second sense) to engage in any action that is right (in the 
first sense).  Moreover, coercive actions that hinder wrong actions (such as self-
defense) are right even though they are coercive, because “hindering a hindrance 
to freedom” is consistent with freedom.4  This means that all rights are, by 
definition, coercively enforceable.  As Kant concludes, “Right and authorization 
to use coercion therefore mean one and the same thing.”5 
Because Kantian rights have this reflexive structure (i.e. I have a right to 
do anything that doesn’t hinder anyone else’s right to do anything that doesn’t 
hinder my right, etc.) our rights can be thought of (at least ideally) as a single, 
integrated system: “a fully reciprocal use of coercion that is consistent with 
everyone’s freedom in accordance with universal laws.”6  Kant refers to the 
preconditions for such an integrated system of rights collectively as “right” in the 
third sense:  “Right is therefore the sum of the conditions under which the choice 
of one can be united with the choice of another in accordance with a universal law 
of freedom.”7  “Right” in this third sense is also called “a rightful condition.”8 
So far, I have only summarized how Kant’s various senses of “right” relate 
to each other.  I have not yet explained why Kant believed that human beings 
actually have rights or why he thought that we are obligated to respect each 
                                                   
3 Ibid.  (Ak. 6:230-1) 
4 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 25.  (Ak. 6:231) (Italics omitted) 
5 Metaphysics of Morals, p.26.  (Ak. 6:232) 
6 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 25.  (Ak. 6:232) 
7 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 24.  (Ak. 6:231) 
8 See for example Metaphysics of Morals, p. 45.  (Ak. 6:256) 
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other’s rights.  Kant’s arguments for these two claims are notoriously hard to 
parse, and a lively debate about their proper interpretation persists to this day.9  
Arthur Ripstein has argued that the Universal Principle of Right is best 
understood as a postulate of the Categorical Imperative.10  Following a brief 
review of the Kantian conception of freedom and its relationship to morality, I 
will explain and adopt Ripstein’s analysis of this relationship as a working 
hypothesis for my subsequent analysis of our rights and corresponding 
obligations under the law. 
Kant has two conceptions of freedom: internal freedom and external 
freedom.11  Internal freedom, or “free will,” is understood by Kant as the capacity 
to make choices independently of “pathological” influences, such as passions and 
inclinations.12  Internal freedom is thus “a negative property in us, namely that of 
not being necessitated to act through any sensible determining grounds.”13  When 
a person exercises internal freedom, she is, by definition, willing “autonomously,” 
meaning that she acting on the basis of a self-given law of reason: the Categorical 
                                                   
9 For a good overview of relevant literature, see Robert B. Pippin, “Mine and 
Thine?  The Kantian State,” Kant and Modern Philosophy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 416-446. 
10 Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), pp. 355-88.  (hereafter Force 
and Freedom)  (Appendix) 
11 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 165.  (Ak. 6:406-7) 
12 As Mary Gregor writes, “Kant uses ‘pathological’ in the sense of ‘dependent 
upon sensibility.”  Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Mary 
Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 17.  (footnote)  (Ak. 
5:19) 
13 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 18.  (Ak. 6:226) 
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Imperative.14  External freedom (i.e. “outer freedom”) is a related but distinct 
idea: physical “independence from being constrained by another’s choice.”15 
The Categorical Imperative commands: “act only in accordance with that 
maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal 
law.”16  Kant explains that our direct apprehension of the moral law shows us that 
we have free will (i.e. internal freedom), even though we live in a world that 
appears to be causally determined.17  The Categorical Imperative demonstrates 
our freedom to us because it presents as normative a ground of action—the form 
of universal law—which by definition abstracts away from all circumstances other 
than our status as “rational beings.”18  If a law can hold for all rational beings as 
such, then our ability to act on it is proof that we are “not being necessitated to 
act through any sensible determining grounds,” since no such grounds are 
included in the concept of a rational being as such. 
In this way, Kant argues, internal freedom and the moral law “reciprocally 
imply each other.”19  Our possession of free will is what makes it the case that we 
                                                   
14 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary 
Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 52.  (Ak 4:446-7)  
(hereafter Groundwork)  A person who instead acts directly on the basis of non-
rational inclinations, such as desires and fears, is exhibiting “heteronomy” of the 
will. 
15 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 30.  (Ak. 6:237) 
16 Groundwork, p. 31.  (Ak. 4:421)  See also Metaphysics of Morals, p. 18.  (Ak. 
6:226) 
17 Critique of Practical Reason, p. 27.  (Ak. 5:29-30) 
18 Kant writes, “a law, as objective, must contain the very same determining 
ground of the will in all cases and for all rational beings.”  Critique of Practical 
Reason, p. 23.  (Ak. 5:25) 
19 Critique of Practical Reason, p. 26.  (Ak. 5:29) 
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are obligated to obey the moral law, but it is our apprehension of our obligation 
to obey the moral law that first shows us that we have free will.20  Kant argues 
that even a morally weak person, who fails to act on the moral law, nonetheless 
knows that she is free if she perceives her obligation to act morally.21  By failing to 
act morally, such a person knowingly surrenders her freedom, allowing her will to 
be heteronomously determined by sensible impulses such as desire or fear.   
Recall that Kant defines external “freedom” as “independence from being 
constrained by another’s choice.”22  The analogy between his two conceptions of 
freedom is now clear: in both cases, “freedom” refers to the exercise of choice 
unconstrained by forces outside of the will.  Internal freedom is freedom from 
constraint by “sensible” inclinations, and external freedom is freedom from 
constraint by other people’s choices.  Just as a principle of action must apply to 
“all rational beings” in order to qualify as a moral law, so any political principle 
that defines which actions are “right” must apply to all embodied rational beings 
with whom we coexist in order to qualify as an external law—a moral license to 
coerce.  The Universal Principle of Right has this reciprocal structure, which 
                                                   
20 “[W]hereas freedom is indeed, the ratio essendi of the moral law, the moral 
law is the ratio cognoscendi of freedom.  For, had not the moral law already been 
distinctly thought in our reason, we should never consider ourselves justified in 
assuming such a thing as freedom.”  Critique of Practical Reason, p. 4.  
(footnote)  (Ak. 5:5) 
21 Offering a famous hypothetical concerning a person who is ordered, on pain of 
execution, to give false testimony against his neighbor, Kant argues that even 
when we doubt whether we would act in accordance with the moral law at great 
personal cost, we are conscious that we could do so.  See Critique of Practical 
Reason, p. 27.  (Ak. 5:30) 
22 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 30.  (Ak. 6:237) 
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makes freedom possible by defining rights in such a way that each person’s rights 
are compatible with everyone else’s rights. 
Because external freedom is analogous to internal freedom except that it 
presupposes our physical coexistence with others, and therefore the possibility of 
coercion, Arthur Ripstein characterizes the Universal Principle of Right as a 
“postulate” of the Categorical Imperative: an “extension” of the idea of freedom to 
a new set of empirical conditions.23  Because my body and your body are both 
solid objects that exist in the same world, Ripstein explains, we cannot both 
occupy the same location at the same time; any effort along these lines would, at 
a minimum, result in my body moving your body out of the way or vice-versa.24  
Because some of my possible actions are physically incompatible with some of 
yours, some of my possible choices are inconsistent with yours in the sense that 
they cannot be simultaneously instantiated. 
This kind of interpersonal constraint on choice is not directly 
contemplated by the Categorical Imperative’s test for maxims.25  We regard 
ourselves as “free agents”—rational beings with the capacity to choose what ends 
we pursue.26  As free agents, potential incompatibilities in space pose a novel 
                                                   
23 “[R]ight governs the relations between free and rational beings who occupy 
space.”  Force and Freedom, p. 358. 
24 See Force and Freedom, p. 370-1. 
25 Of course, if your maxims refer to other people, the Categorical Imperative will 
constrain the ways in which you may act towards them, but this is only an 
internal requirement of morality.  The Categorical Imperative has nothing to say 
on its own about when others may physically coerce us.  See Force and Freedom, 
p. 368. 
26 Ripstein uses the term “purposiveness” to refer to “your capacity to choose the 
ends you will use your means to pursue.”  Force and Freedom, p. 34.  He refers to 
beings that have this capacity as “purposive beings.”  See for example Force and 
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threat to our freedom: physical coercion.  To preserve the possibility of freedom, 
we need a postulate that extends the idea of freedom to resolve potential physical 
conflicts between my possible choices and yours.  Because space is “the form of 
all appearances of outer sense,”27 Ripstein maintains that the Universal Principle 
of Right involves a strictly external conception of freedom, limiting only actions, 
not thoughts or purposes, and relying only on the external incentive of state 
coercion to secure our compliance.28  Thus conceived, the Universal Principle of 
Right is the Categorical Imperative’s mirror image: an external representation of 
the internal law of rational beings.29   
Because the Universal Principle of Right applies an a priori concept—
freedom—to a set of empirical conditions—a plurality of embodied beings who 
occupy space—it cannot be logically derived from the Categorical Imperative, nor 
can it be empirically demonstrated.  The Universal Principle of Right is, 
therefore, “a postulate that is incapable of further proof.”30   
                                                   
Freedom, p. 58.  I consider the terms “free agency” and “free agent” more 
intuitive and use them herein.  No difference in meaning is intended. 
27 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, in The Cambridge Edition of the 
Works of Immanuel Kant: Critique of Pure Reason Vol. II, trans. Paul Guyer & 
Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 159.  
(A26/B42) (hereafter Critique of Pure Reason) 
28 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 24.  (Ak. 6:231)  In order to be an “action,” a 
movement must be voluntary—it must be the manifestation of a choice.  If a 
sudden gust of wind blows me into you, your freedom is not thereby violated 
because my unchosen physical movement was not an action.  This limitation 
reflects the interpersonal nature of Kant’s conception of external freedom.  See, 
infra, pp. 51-2. 
29 Ripstein writes, “[S]pace is, for Kant, the form of outer sense, and the 
Universal Principle of Right is the law of outer (external) freedom.”  Force and 
Freedom, p. 369. 
30 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 25.  (Ak. 6:231) 
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Nonetheless, Ripstein concludes, we must accept the Universal Principle 
of Right as a normative principle because it alone reconciles otherwise conflicting 
self-perceptions:  I cannot help seeing myself both 1) as a free agent, and also 2) 
as one among a plurality of free agents who occupy space, and are therefore 
mutually subject to coercion.31  It is thus a “practical necessity” for me to regard 
myself as having rights.  Moreover, because “right” is by definition a universal 
principle applicable to all embodied free agents, it follows that I am rationally 
required to regard other people as having rights also. 
A Taxonomy of Individual Rights 
In his introduction to the Doctrine of Right, Kant defines “juridical 
science” as “systematic knowledge of the doctrine of natural right,” which “must 
supply the immutable principles for any giving of positive law.”32  Kant’s 
principles of natural right constitute the essential framework of the law of private 
right.33  Recall that Kant conceives of “right” in terms of equal freedom: I have a 
right to do anything that does not interfere with your freedom, and you have the 
right to do anything that does not interfere with mine.  At the most abstract level, 
then, the thing that we each have “a right to” is freedom itself.  Kant writes: 
Freedom (independence from being constrained by another’s 
choice), insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every 
                                                   
31 Force and Freedom, p. 361. 
32 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 23.  (Ak. 6:229) 
33 Kant’s doctrine of right is divided into two parts:  natural right and public (i.e. 
“civil”) right.  See Metaphysics of Morals, p. 34.  (Ak. 6:242) 
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other in accordance with a universal law, is the only original 
right belonging to every man by virtue of his humanity.34 
Kant refers to this right as “innate freedom.”35   
 
Our innate freedom includes, at a minimum, the right to be free of direct 
bodily attack.  Kant believed this to be the case because he conceived of a person 
as “an absolute unity.”36  That is, he believed that we do not merely possess our 
bodies.  Rather, our bodies, like our rational consciousness, are constitutive of 
us.37  At first, this appears to be an outdated metaphysical view of the nature of 
persons, decreasingly plausible in a world in which, for example, organ donation 
is possible.38  In the context of donation, my kidney appears to be only 
contingently mine rather than constitutively mine, and therefore alienable.   
However, Kant’s account is more flexible and plausible if it is understood 
as a specific application of his more general view that the individuation of objects 
considered noumenally (that is, the individuation of objects insofar as rights 
attach to them) is a function of practical reason.  Kant believed that a portion of 
the external world can become a distinct “object of choice” to which rights may 
attach only if a person takes herself to have the power to use it as a distinct 
                                                   
34 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 30.  (Ak. 6:237) 
35 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 30.  (Ak. 6:237) 
36 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 62.  (Ak. 6:278) 
37 Kant writes, “a human being cannot have property in himself, much less in 
another person.”  Metaphysics of Morals, p. 127.  (Ak. 6:359) 
38 I am grateful to Frances Kamm for helpful comments regarding Kant’s 
metaphysics of identity. 
  15 
object.39  Analogously, my body must be conceived of as a whole except insofar as 
I perceive myself to have the power to make separate use of its parts.   
Because no person took herself to have the power to make separate use of 
her kidney in Kant’s time, his conception of a person as “a complete unity” made 
sense in the context of his practical philosophy.  In our time, my kidney can be 
thought of as “an object distinct from me,” because I take myself to have the 
power to use it as a separate “object of choice” by donating it.40  Because my 
relationship to my body as a whole is not (yet) a contingent one, and because our 
bodies are the unitary “objects of choice” that we begin our adult lives with 
insofar as we control our own bodily movements, I believe it remains the case 
that our right to be free of bodily attack is the appropriate starting place for any 
theory of rights.  My body is an inseparable whole to which I am entitled until I 
choose to make some separate use of any part of it. 
Another aspect of our innate right is our ability to acquire land and certain 
other things in the external world.  Kant calls the principle that authorizes such 
acquisitions “the postulate of practical reason with regard to rights.”41  It is 
sometimes called the “lex permissiva” for short, because it holds that we are 
permitted but not required to acquire additional rightful possessions defined by 
the three ancient categories of property, contract, and status.42  Like all 
                                                   
39 I take this subject up at somewhat more length in my discussion of property 
acquisition.  See, infra, p. 16-17. 
40 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 43.  (Ak. 6:253) 
41 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 40.  (Ak. 6:246)  (capitalization omitted) 
42 See, for example, Katrin Flikschuh, “Freedom and Constraint in Kant’s 
Metaphysical Elements of Justice,” History of Political Thought 20 (1999): 250-
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postulates, the lex permissiva is not conceptually contained in a prior principle, 
nor can it be empirically demonstrated.  Rather, Kant connects this postulate to 
the Universal Principle of Right in the same way that Ripstein connects the 
Universal Principle of Right to the Categorical Imperative: the lex permissiva is a 
further extension of the idea of freedom to a situation in which a plurality of 
embodied free agents coexist with physical objects that they can use in order to 
achieve their purposes.   
Kant’s initial argument establishing the lex permissiva in the context of 
property is notoriously hard to parse, and what follows is my best understanding 
of this difficult passage.43  Kant first observes that human beings can use land 
and other external objects in order to achieve their purposes.  Anything that a 
person takes herself to have the physical power to use as a distinct object is what 
Kant calls “an object of choice.”44  My right to be free from bodily constraint 
incidentally establishes my right to use some, though not all, external objects of 
choice, but only while I am in physical contact with them.  For example, in a 
world without property rights, I am always entitled to be in whatever space on the 
earth’s surface I happen to occupy, because it would violate my innate right to 
forcibly move my body elsewhere.45  Similarly, I have a right to use an external 
                                                   
271.  Kant uses the Latin phrase lex permissiva to refer to permissive laws in 
general.  See, for example, Metaphysics of Morals, p. 16.  (Ak. 6:223) 
43 See Metaphysics of Morals, pp. 40-2.  (Ak. 6:246-252)  I am grateful to Arthur 
Applbaum for illuminating discussions about this passage. 
44 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 41. (Ak. 6:246) 
45 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 38.  (Ak. 6:248) 
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object if I am holding it in my hands, because it would violate my innate right to 
loosen my physical grasp.46 
But mere innate freedom cannot directly establish my right to use objects 
that are much larger than the human body itself.47  For example, an entire field 
can be an “object of choice” if I take myself to have the physical power to grow a 
crop on it, but my choice to grow sugar on a given field is physically incompatible 
with your choice to grow wheat on the same field at the same time.  Either choice 
is compatible with everyone’s right to be free of bodily constraint (assuming a 
crowd is not standing on the field in question), even each other’s: I can plant 
sugar while you busily uproot my completed work a few feet behind me without 
ever touching me.  In a world without property rights, therefore, I might be 
tempted to conclude that we both have a right to choose to grow our preferred 
crop.  Yet, such conflicting “rights” are logically contradictory: your exercise of a 
right cannot prevent my exercise of a right, because any action that hinders a 
right action is, by definition, wrong, which just means “not right.”  No action can 
simultaneously be right and wrong.  The right to acquire property is a necessary 
extension of the idea of freedom because my possible choices—including possible 
actions on maxims that extend over a period of time, such as “I will grow a crop 
of wheat in order to bake bread”—must be compatible with your possible choices.  
Property rights reconcile our sets of possible choices by giving individuals 
exclusive rightful access to specific objects of choice.  The question of who may 
                                                   
46 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 38.  (Ak. 6:248) 
47 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 40.  (Ak. 6:246) 
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rightfully grow her preferred crop on a given field can now be answered by 
determining to whom the field belongs.48 
The lex permissiva also licenses us to make binding contracts with others.  
Kant describes a contract as “an act of the united choice of two persons by which 
anything at all that belongs to one passes to the other.”49  Ripstein explains why 
the idea of uniting two wills is essential to the notion of contract by considering 
the simple case of making a gift.50  Simply handing you my watch would not be 
enough to change its ownership, he points out, because Kant’s argument 
establishing the lex permissiva in the context of property demonstrates that 
ownership (which Kant variously calls “noumenal possession,” “intelligible 
possession,” and “merely rightful possession”) must be distinct from physical 
possession.51  Nor can any other unilateral act of mine cause the watch to belong 
to you, because that would alter your normative situation without your consent.52  
(Perhaps it contains gemstones mined by mistreated foreign workers, and you 
therefore do not want to own it.  Surely you can prevent something from 
becoming even momentarily yours by choosing not to accept it.)  As Ripstein 
observes, even if I wish to give you the watch and you wish to receive it, we can’t 
quite accomplish this in two separate acts, because if I unilaterally cede 
                                                   
48 Of course, Kant must also establish the conditions under which property can be 
acquired without violating anyone’s innate right.  See, infra, pp. 25-8. 
49 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 57.  (Ak. 6:271) 
50 Force and Freedom, p. 113.  Te giving of a gift is an example of what Kant calls 
a “gratuitous contract.”  Metaphysics of morals, p. 67.  (Ak. 6:285) 
51 Ibid.  See also Metaphysics of Morals, p. 42.  (Ak. 6:252) 
52 See, infra, pp. 28. 
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possession of the watch, it becomes, however momentarily, res nullius.53  At that 
point, your claim to it is no better than anyone else’s, despite my wishes.  
It must, therefore, be the case that two people unite their wills in order to 
alter their respective rights and obligations simultaneously.  A contract just is a 
union of the choices of two (or more) people, which is why courts construe the 
ambiguous terms of a contract by reference to “the meeting of the minds” 
between contracting parties.54  As parties to a private contract, our united wills 
alter our rights, while everyone else’s rights (or lack thereof) with respect to the 
transferred property remain unaltered.  Similarly, the right to contract allows me 
to alienate some of my future labor to you by means of our united choice.  A 
contract for a future performance of this sort can be thought of formally as 
establishing one person’s possession of another’s future choice.  As Kant writes, 
“the other’s promise is included in my belongings and goods.”55 
Kant’s rationale for the right to contract is essentially the same as his 
rationale for property: conflicting rights are impossible, so contracts are 
necessary to ensure that all rights are mutually compatible, and therefore 
possible.  Suppose I want to sell my house, and both Smith and Jones wish to 
own it.  Neither Smith nor Jones has an existing right to possess my house, 
because it belongs to me.  If I transfer a right to Smith to possess the house, I am 
                                                   
53 See Force and Freedom, p. 114. 
54 See for example Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 2 Hurl. & C. 906 (Court of Exchequer 
1864). 
55 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 38.  (Ak. 6:248)  The nature of a contract for 
personal labor, and how it can be distinguished from an agreement to alienate 
one’s freedom, are complicated matters not profitable to delve into here. 
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legally disabled by the law of contract from transferring that same right a second 
time to Jones, or from continuing to possess it myself. 
Finally, Kant argues that a “natural permissive law” establishes the right to 
acquire a domestic relationship, understood as a set of rights and obligations 
between members of a household (i.e. “the domestic condition”).56  Kant divides 
these relationships into three types: 1) the marital relationship, 2) the parent-
child relationship, and 3) the householder-servant relationship.57  Unlike a 
merely contractual relationship, by which I might acquire your promise, but not 
you, Kant conceives of a domestic relationship as a way of possessing a person.58  
The feature that makes a Kantian domestic relationship possessory is the legal 
right (at that time) to compel members of the household to physically return to 
the household, and the related right to compel any other person to relinquish 
physical custody of a household member.59  Kant characterizes the marital 
relationship as one of mutual possession, such that either partner can rightfully 
demand the other’s presence in the marital home, although he also writes that a 
man’s “natural superiority” justifies a law requiring wives to obey their 
husbands.60  In the other two cases, possession is explicitly unilateral: parents are 
                                                   
56 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 61.  (Ak. 6:276) 
57 See Metaphysics of Morals, p. 61.  (Ak. 6:277) 
58 See Metaphysics of Morals, p. 126.  (Ak. 6:358) 
59 Kant writes, “there is a right to persons akin to a right to things (of the head of 
the house over servants); for he can fetch servants back and demand them from 
anyone in possession of them, as what is externally his, even before the reasons 
that may have led them to run away and their rights have been investigated.”  
Metaphysics of Morals, p. 66.  (Ak. 6:284) 
60 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 62-3.  (Ak. 6:278-9) 
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thought to possess their children and householders are thought to possess their 
servants. 
Domestic relationships are characterized by Kant as a kind of rightful 
possession because “possessing something is a precondition of its being possible 
to use it.”  Kant’s domestic relationships include certain limited rights to “make 
direct use of a person as of a thing, as a means to my end, but still without 
infringing on his personality.”61  Because these relationships involve the “direct 
use” of household members (rather than the exchange of means enabled merely 
by contract), Kant writes that domestic relationships are formed “neither by deed 
on one’s own initiative (facto) nor by a contract (pacto) alone but by law (lege).”62  
Kant is referring to natural law, not positive law: “the right of humanity in our 
own person, from which there follows a natural permissive law, by the favor of 
which this sort of acquisition is possible for us.”63 
Because Kantian domestic relationships involve the possession and use of 
another person, they must be justified as a prerequisite to a “morally necessary 
end.”64  However, this morally necessary end need not be the subjective purpose 
of either party in the relationship.  For example, Kant believed that marriage 
                                                   
61 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 127.  (Ak. 6:359)  Elsewhere Kant uses the word 
“personality” to refer to “a human being represented in terms of his capacity for 
freedom…independent of his physical attributes.”  Metaphysics of Morals, p. 32.  
(Ak. 6:239)  I therefore take Kant to mean here that domestic relationships 
involve possession of another person that is not contrary to that person’s capacity 
for freedom.  I am grateful to Michael Joel Kessler for helpful comments on this 
point. 
62 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 61.  (Ak. 6:276) 
63 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 61.  (Ak. 6:276) 
64 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 127.  (Ak. 6:359) 
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required natural law authority because the act of sexual intercourse was a 
(mutual) instance of using another person as a means to one’s own enjoyment.65  
According to Kant, the preservation of humanity through procreation is the 
morally necessary end of sex,66 but Kant did not consider it wrong for a married 
couple to have sex for the subjective purpose of pleasure.67  The development of 
children’s free agency is the morally necessary purpose of coercion within the 
parent-child relationship, but Kant thought that parents could rightfully 
“constrain [a child] to carry out and comply with any of their directions that are 
not contrary to a possible lawful freedom.”68  I take Kant to mean that a parent 
may rightfully coerce her child to perform personal services for her, thereby using 
her child “as of a thing, as a means to my end,”69 so long as the parent’s actions 
do not prevent her child from developing into a free agent.70   
                                                   
65 See Metaphysics of Morals, p. 62.  (Ak. 6:278)  Kant writes, “if one were to 
make oneself such a thing [an object of sexual enjoyment] by contract, the 
contract would be contrary to law.”  Metaphysics of Morals, p. 128.  (Ak. 6:360)  
Kant doesn’t weigh in on the question of whether marital rape is wrong, but on a 
sympathetic reading, the mutually of possession which characterizes Kant’s 
conception of marriage supports that conclusion: in a case of mutual possession, 
one party’s choice not to have sex would neutralize another party’s choice to have 
sex, which would amount to a veto. 
66 See Metaphysics of Morals, p. 179.  (Ak. 6:426) 
67 Kant writes, “The end of begetting and bringing up children may be the end of 
nature, for which it implanted the inclinations of the sexes for each other; but it is 
not requisite for human being who marry to make this their end in order for their 
union to be compatible with rights, for otherwise marriage would be dissolved 
when procreation ceases.”  Metaphysics of Morals, p. 62.  (Ak. 6:277) 
68 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 128.  (Ak. 6:360) 
69 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 127.  (Ak. 6:359) 
70 Arthur Ripstein appears to disagree with my interpretation of these passages.  
Indicating that his view on this point as identical to Kant’s view, Ripstein writes: 
“Precisely because the children are nonconsenting parties, parents may not use 
their children in pursuit of their own ends.”  Force and Freedom, p. 71. 
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It is less intuitively obvious what the morally necessary end of the 
householder-servant relationship could be, and Kant does not make this explicit.  
What follows is my best guess.  Kant’s discussions of marriage and parenthood 
establish that he considered familial relations, and therefore households, 
essential to the survival of humanity.  Moreover, Kant conceived of a household 
as “a community of free beings who form a society of members of a whole.”71  
Because Kant viewed a household as a mini-society, he may have thought that a 
household required a unifying principle of governance—an unwritten domestic 
constitution that defines household relationships and vests final executive 
authority in the head of the household.72 
Kant distinguishes a mere hired hand from a servant who is also a 
household member by the nature of the employment contract: a domestic 
servant’s contract is effectively a lease of herself, because “the servant agrees to 
do whatever is permissible for the welfare of the household” during her 
employment.73  By contrast, a hired hand—even if she resides within the house—
is hired for a set of defined tasks, and is therefore not a member of the 
household.74  Although Kant believed that householders might “use” the powers 
of servants while they remain in the household, servants’ contracts “cannot be 
                                                   
71 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 61.  (Ak. 6:276) 
72 Indeed, Kant in a footnote refers to the relationship between a head of 
household and one of its members as that of “domestic ruler and subject.”   
Metaphysics of Morals, p. 66.  (Ak. 6:283)  (footnote) 
73 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 128.  (Ak. 6:360-1) 
74 Ibid. 
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concluded for life but at most only for an unspecified time, within which one 
party may give the other notice.”75 
Natural law authority is one of the prerequisites for the formation of each 
type of Kantian domestic relationship, but it is not the sole prerequisite for any of 
them.  Two of the three domestic relationships that Kant describes, marriage and 
the householder-servant relationship, require both natural law authority and 
contract.  A Kantian marital relationship requires a deed for its formation as 
well—the act of consummation.76  The third kind of Kantian domestic 
relationship, that between parent and child, has two of these three preconditions: 
natural law and the deed of procreation.77  
Kant emphasizes that the unusual possessory power that characterizes 
domestic relationships does not amount to a property interest.  One respect in 
which these interests differ is that, while property can be alienated, a domestic 
relationship cannot be sold or otherwise freely transferred, although it may be 
dissolved under certain conditions.78  The manner in which Kant believed that 
household members may “use” each other is also limited by the natural law 
authority which makes them rightful: spouses may only “use” each other’s sexual 
attributes; parents may only use children in ways consistent with their 
attainment of free agency; householders may only use servants in a manner 
                                                   
75 Ibid. 
76 See Metaphysics of Morals, p. 63.  (Ak. 6:279) 
77 See Metaphysics of Morals, p. 64.  (Ak. 6:281) 
78 See Metaphysics of Morals, p. 61.  (Ak. 6:277) 
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consistent with their inner morality.79  Note that the test for permissible “use” in 
the marital relationship is one of inclusion: only the specifically necessary kind of 
use is justified.  By contrast, the acceptable uses in the parent-child and 
householder-servant relationships are defined only by a side constraint: all uses 
are permissible unless they are inconsistent with the natural law purpose that 
makes the relationship permissible. 
The foregoing is my best reading of Kant’s view of the nature of domestic 
relationships.  I can personally endorse his characterization of such relationships 
as “possession of a person” only with respect to the parent-child relationship, 
because the person possessed in the context of that relationship is not yet a free 
agent.  By contrast, Kant’s characterization of the marital relationship as one of 
mutual physical possession is driven by his implausible account of consensual sex 
as a mutual instance of each partner’s use of another person “as a thing.”  If 
consensual sex is better characterized as a cooperative activity, and if households 
need not be conceived of as miniature republics led by a single executive, then 
marriage and householder-servant relationships are really contractual, rather 
than possessory in nature.  While a full exploration of the nature of domestic 
relationships is beyond the scope of this project, I suspect that these are cases in 
which Kant made a mistake, albeit a historically understandable one. 
The Impossibility of Rights in a State of Nature 
Our rights to acquire property, make binding contracts, and enter into 
status relationships are constitutive of our equal external freedom, but these 
                                                   
79 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 128.  (Ak. 6:360-1) 
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acquired rights can’t exist without a state.  Kant conceives of external freedom as 
“independence from being constrained by another’s choice.”80  It follows that 
someone who lives in total isolation is free despite any natural hardships she may 
encounter.81  When people live near each other, however, we can be free only if 
we can have acquired rights, because these legal frameworks make our sets of 
possible choices mutually consistent.  Kant offers three closely-related reasons 
why conclusive acquired rights cannot exist outside the context of a civil 
condition. 
When I claim to have a right to an external object of choice, Kant observes, 
I am really declaring that everyone else is obligated to refrain from interfering 
with my possession of that object.82  Because the concept of a right is limited to 
that which can be acquired under the terms of a universal law, my declaration 
contains an acknowledgment that others can obligate me in the same way that I 
am claiming to obligate them.83  Rights, therefore, are reciprocal in the specific 
sense that they are necessarily created by universal rules applicable equally to all 
free agents. 
Such reciprocal external obligations, Kant argues, require a guarantee in 
order to be normatively effective: you are not obligated to honor my rights-claims 
(that is, my claims do refer to actual rights) unless I can provide you with 
                                                   
80 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 30.  (Ak. 6:237)  From now on, where I believe that 
context makes my meaning clear, I refer simply to “freedom,” by which I will 
generally mean external freedom. 
81 Force and Freedom, p. 36. 
82 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 44.  (Ak. 6:255) 
83 Ibid. 
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“assurance” that I will honor your rights-claims in turn.84  Because external 
freedom is “independence from being constrained by another’s choice,” the 
required “assurance” must be something more than each person’s voluntary 
choice to respect the rights-claims of her neighbors.  Only an “external 
constraint” in the form of coercive enforcement of rights-claims by a third party 
(so that you need not depend on my good nature in order to be secure in what is 
yours and vice-versa) makes acquired rights possible.85  Kant concludes that 
“assurance…is already contained in the concept of an obligation corresponding to 
an external right.”86 
Rights are impossible in a state of nature for a second reason as well: 
rights-claims are frequently underdetermined until they are enforced.  Kant has 
explained that all practical principles require judgment in order to apply them to 
particular situations.87  As a result, people often reasonably disagree about what 
their rights are in specific instances: when I sold you my field, did our contract 
                                                   
84 “I am…not under an obligation to leave external objects belonging to others 
untouched unless everyone else provides me assurance that he will behave in 
accordance with the same principle with regard to what is mine.”  Metaphysics of 
Morals, p. 44.  (Ak. 6:255-6) 
85 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 21.  (Ak. 6:220) 
86 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 45.  (Ak. 6:256)  As Mulholland writes, “The test of 
whether an action can be prescribed or prohibited by the principle of rights is 
whether it or its omission can be rightly coerced.”  See Kant’s System of Rights, p. 
175. 
87 Kant writes, “To show generally how one ought to subsume under these rules, 
i.e., distinguish whether something stands under them or not, this could not 
happen except once again through a rule. But just because this is a rule, it would 
demand another instruction for the power of judgment, and so it becomes clear 
that although the understanding is certainly capable of being instructed and 
equipped through rules, the power of judgment is a special talent that cannot be 
taught but only practiced."  Critique of Pure Reason, p. 268. (A133/B172) 
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transfer the water rights in the river that borders it?  Do your loud parties 
interfere with my quiet enjoyment of my home?  Kant’s insight about the 
application of principles to particulars means that such questions may sometimes 
have two equally formally correct answers.  In a state of nature, such conflicting 
judgments make well-defined rights impossible, because each individual retains 
the right to do “whatever seems right and good” in her own judgment. Only a 
single definitive mechanism for deciding between two reasonable applications of 
the abstract principles of right can render our rights mutually consistent. 
Finally, Kant argues that property rights cannot exist in a state of nature 
because the unilateral acquisition of property would change the normative 
situation of others without their consent, which is conceptually impossible.88  To 
say that I have a right to the exclusive possession and use of something is just to 
say that no other person may rightfully possess or use it.89  No obligation can be 
imposed on a free agent by anyone else, because autonomy—the state of being 
governed only by self-given laws—is the necessary condition of a free will.90  
Rights are a precondition of our external freedom, but external freedom itself is 
“independence from being constrained by another’s choice.”91  Acquired rights, 
therefore, cannot exist in a state of nature because no individual person can, by 
her unilateral choice, impose obligations on others. 
                                                   
88 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 45.  (Ak. 6:256) 
89 Kant writes, “[A] right against every possessor of the thing…is what constitutes 
any right to a thing.”  Metaphysics of Morals, p. 59.  (Ak. 6:274)  (italics omitted) 
90 Kant writes, “From [internal freedom] it follows that a person is subject to no 
other laws than those he gives to himself (either alone or at least along with 
others).”  Metaphysics of Morals, p. 16.  (Ak. 6:223) 
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Justifying the State 
Kant has shown that we each have a right to external freedom, but that 
freedom is impossible for a plurality of embodied free agents who coexist in a 
state of nature.  His next task is to reconcile his conception of freedom with the 
Kantian state’s coercive powers in order to show that freedom is possible in a civil 
condition.92  In short, our possible choices must be limited to those choices that 
are consistent with the equal freedom of all.  But, because freedom is 
“independence from being constrained by another’s choice,” our possible choices 
must not be constrained by the choice of anyone other than ourselves. 
The solution to this problem lies in the fact that we are each rationally 
required to have our own external freedom as an end.93  Because state authority 
is the only means to our end, we are rationally required to regard the state’s 
necessary powers as having been authorized by our own will, united with the wills 
of our fellow subjects: “a collective general (common) and powerful will.”94  The 
state imposes legal obligations on us, constraining our choices to those that are 
compatible with the equal freedom of all.  In doing so, however, it does not make 
us unfree, because we are not constrained by anyone else’s choice.  Instead, we 
                                                   
91 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 30.  (Ak. 6:237) 
92 Natural law principles must “establish the authority of the lawgiver (i.e., his 
authorization to bind others by his mere choice).”  Metaphysics of Morals, p. 17.  
(Ak. 6:224) 
93 Kant writes that a rightful condition is “that condition which reason, by a 
categorical imperative, makes it obligatory for us to strive for.”  Metaphysics of 
Morals, p. 95.  (Ak. 6: 318) 
94 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 45.  (Ak. 6:256) 
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are rationally required to regard our state’s laws as constraints that we have 
chosen to impose on ourselves. 
How does such a legitimate state come about?  Unlike some traditional 
social contract theorists, Kant cannot condition state legitimacy on the consent of 
the people, because the Kantian state establishes the independence that makes 
consent normatively effective.95  Any attempt to establish the preconditions of 
consent through consent would be circular, so consent is neither a necessary nor 
a sufficient condition for state legitimacy.96 
Kant believed, therefore, that all states are established coercively, even if 
individuals appear to consent to a new regime: 
Unconditional submission of the people’s will (which in itself 
is not united and is therefore without law) to a sovereign will 
(uniting all by means of one law) is a fact that can begin only 
by seizing supreme power and so first establishing public 
right.97 
                                                   
95 Kant writes that a civil constitution “is the supreme formal condition of all 
other external duty.”  Immanuel Kant, “On the Common Saying: This May Be 
True in Theory, but It Does Not Hold in Practice,” in Pauline Kleingeld, Ed., 
Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History, 
Trans. David L. Colclasure (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006) p. 44.  
(hereafter Theory and Practice)  (Ak. 8:289)  See also Kant’s System of Rights, p. 
290. 
96 See Kant’s System of Rights, p. 289.  Even if you appear to consent to a state 
while in the state of nature, your consent cannot be normatively effective due to 
the lack of what Rawls would call the “background conditions” for consent.  
Although Kant’s own idea about what constitutes fair background conditions for 
bargaining differs from Rawls’ view, the two philosophers agree that bargaining 
in the state of nature is inherently coercive. 
97 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 137.  (Ak. 6:372)  Kant writes elsewhere of the 
general will: “the implementation of this idea in practice can rely on nothing but 
violence to establish the juridical condition.”  Immanuel Kant, “Toward Perpetual 
Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,” in Pauline Kleingeld, Ed., Toward Perpetual 
Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History, Trans. David L. 
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How does Kant justify the act of “seizing supreme power,” and subsequent law 
enforcement by those who came to power in this way?  His answer is contained in 
an important “corollary” to his argument against the possibility of unilaterally 
authorized property rights: 
If it must be possible, in terms of rights, to have an external 
object as one’s own, the subject must also be permitted to 
constrain everyone else with whom he comes into conflict 
about whether an external object is his or another’s to enter 
along with him into a civil condition.98 
In a state of nature, I do not yet have a functioning state to insist that 
others join, so I cannot simply ask the state to enforce existing law with respect to 
my recalcitrant neighbors.  Rather, I may permissibly coerce others in an effort to 
establish a civil condition.99  Such permissible coercion includes a coercive 
defense of what Kant calls “provisionally rightful possession” of land that is 
unilaterally claimed “in anticipation of and preparation for the civil condition.”100 
The ongoing coercive authority of a mature state is justified in the same 
way that these individual coercive actions are justified in the state of nature: as a 
                                                   
Colclasure (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), p. 95.  (hereafter Perpetual 
Peace)  (Ak. 8:371)  The impossibility of consent is why Kant argues that a state’s 
pedigree is irrelevant to the question of its legitimacy.  All states come into 
existence through force, and there is no good reason why legitimacy should 
depend on whether forceful seizure of power first occurred ten years ago or a 
hundred.  Metaphysics of Morals, p. 95.  (Ak. 6:318) 
98 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 45, 90.  (Ak. 6:256, 6:312) 
99 Kant writes that the deed of “taking control” is “the condition and the basis” for 
public authority.  Metaphysics of Morals, p. 137.  (Ak. 6:371) 
100 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 45.  (Ak. 6:256-7)  Kant writes, “Prior to entering [a 
civil] condition, a subject who is ready for [a state] resists with right those who 
are not willing to submit to it and who want to interfere with his present 
possession.”  Ibid.  See also MM 6:267, Gregor p. 54. 
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necessary precondition to our ability to acquire rights, without which none of us 
can enjoy external freedom.  Indeed, within the territory of an existing state, I 
believe that the Kantian right to coerce someone to enter into a civil condition is 
exactly the same thing as the authority to enforce the law: if you are acting 
lawlessly within the territory of a state, what else could a right to coerce you to 
join the state entail but the enforcement of its laws against you?  It cannot mean 
that I can force you to give your consent, since that is a contradiction.  It cannot 
mean that I can require you to recognize your obligation to obey the law, since it 
is impossible for one person to coerce another to adopt any principle of action.  In 
the context of a modern nation state, therefore, the authority to coerce someone 
to enter into a civil condition just is the state’s authority to enforce its law against 
anyone within its territory. 
While no other person can force me to recognize an obligation to respect 
the rights of others, Kant argues that I am rationally required to do so insofar as 
my choices presuppose my own secure rights to person and property.  Leslie 
Mulholland summarizes: 
[T]he general will is already contained in the claim to an 
acquired right, not because it is necessary to submit to the 
general will in order to achieve one’s end, but because a 
moral being, a person, is unavoidably bound by laws in 
relations with others concerning the use of external 
objects.101 
To understand Mulholland’s point, recall the distinction that Kant makes 
between a choice and a mere wish: both are activities of the will, but to choose an 
end, I must set myself to the task of achieving it, which involves taking myself to 
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have the means to achieve it.102  External freedom is the ability to make choices 
independently from constraint by the choices of others.  Therefore, if I choose to 
grow a crop, I must take myself to have the necessary means to my end: rightful 
access to the field on which I intend to grow it.  In other words, I must take 
myself to have a property right.103 
Because laws, whether internal or external, are universal by definition, it 
follows that, if I acquire a property right in a particular field, my right is made 
possible by a universal principle that equally enables others to acquire property 
rights.  My claim to own property therefore contains the claim that everyone can 
acquire property according to the same principle. The state is thus authorized by 
each of us to impose “the sum of conditions under which the choice of one can be 
united with the choice of another in accordance with a universal law of 
freedom.”104 
The Idea of The Original Contract 
The Kantian state is the concept of the “three authorities” that are a priori 
necessary to establish a rightful condition by rendering the possible choices of 
each individual consistent with the freedom of all.105  Because we are each 
rationally required to have our external freedom as an end, the state must be 
                                                   
101 Kant’s System of Rights, p. 304. 
102 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 13.   (Ak. 6:213) 
103 Alternatively, I must take myself to have a lease or permission from the person 
who does have a property right. 
104 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 24.  (Ak. 6:230) 
105 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 90.  (Ak. 6:313) 
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regarded as having been authorized by the “general united will” of the people.106  
Kant refers to the three authorities as “necessary” laws that “follow of themselves 
from concepts of external right as such (are not statutory).”107  They are “the form 
of a state as such, that is, of the state in idea, as it ought to be in accordance with 
pure principles of right.”108  Kant refers to this ideal state as “the original 
contract,” but he emphasizes that he does not mean that any actual agreement 
was or must be made.109  Rather, the state reflects only “the idea of this act, in 
terms of which alone we can think of the legitimacy of a state.”110  
Kant develops the idea of the original contract by considering what 
authorities a state must have in order to solve the problems—assurance, 
indeterminacy, and unilateral choice—that make acquired rights impossible in 
the state of nature.  He concludes: 
Every state contains three authorities within it, that is, the 
general united will consists of three persons: the sovereign 
authority in the person of the legislator; the executive 
authority in the person of the ruler (in conformity to law); 
and the judicial authority (to award to each what is his in 
accordance with the law) in the person of the judge.111   
The sovereign, or legislative, authority is the authority to make laws on behalf of 
all subjects, thus avoiding a situation in which the unilateral choices of some 
infringe on the freedom of others.  The judicial authority is the authority to 
                                                   
106 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 90-1.  (Ak. 6:313) 
107 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 90.  (Ak. 6:313) 
108 Ibid. 
109 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 92.  (Ak. 6:315) 
110 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 93.  (Ak. 6:313) 
111 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 91.  (Ak. 6:313) (latin omitted) 
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conclusively resolve disputes about rights by establishing an objective procedure 
for resolving the residual indeterminacy that is always possible when principles 
are applied to particulars.  The executive authority is the authority to enforce the 
law, so that everyone will have adequate assurance that her rights are secure. 
Kant writes that these three authorities may not usurp each other’s 
functions.112  For example, “a people’s sovereign (legislator) cannot also be its 
ruler [the executive authority], since the ruler is subject to the law and so is put 
under obligation through the law by another, namely the sovereign.”113  Kant 
describes the injustice that occurs when one of the state’s three authorities usurps 
the role of another as “despotism.”  For example, a legislative body that directly 
arrests those whose actions its members wish to outlaw instead of passing 
legislation acts despotically.  Similarly an executive branch official who illegally 
arrests a subject acts despotically. 
Kant does not mean that the three authorities—which he conceives of as 
“moral persons”—must necessarily be exercised by different human beings.  
Indeed, he believed that the idea of the original contract could, in principle, be 
fully instantiated by an autocrat: a single natural person who holds all three of 
the state’s authorities.  An autocratic government “is the most dangerous for a 
people, in view of how conducive it is to despotism,” but it is not despotic by 
definition.114  An autocrat can avoid governing despotically by exercising her 
                                                   
112 Kant writes of the three authorities, “one of them, in assisting another, cannot 
also usurp its function; instead, each has its own principle.”  Metaphysics of 
Morals, p. 93.  (Ak. 6:316) 
113 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 94.  (Ak. 6:317) 
114 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 111.  (Ak. 6:339) 
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legislative authority separately and prior to any exercise of her judicial authority, 
which applies legislative principles to particulars, or her executive authority, 
which enforces the law.  Surprisingly, Kant claims that an autocrat cannot 
rightfully give away her right to legislate on behalf of the people, since the 
legislative authority does not contain the right to alienate itself.  Instead, she 
should “reform” her government until it “harmonizes in its effect” with the idea of 
the original contract, by establishing separate executive and judicial branches.115 
I believe that the state’s three authorities must, in principle, be exercised 
independently in order to be exercised at all, because they involve three 
metaphysically distinct activities.  Legislation, understood as the creation of a 
law, is a conceptual activity.  Judgment is the application of legal concepts to 
particular physical objects.  Executive law enforcement is physically coercive, is 
authorized by legislation, and is constrained by the judgments of the judicial 
authority.  The principle of non-usurpation makes each authority supreme within 
its own distinct sphere: 
[T]he will of the legislator with regard to what is externally 
mine or yours is irreproachable; that the executive power of 
the supreme ruler is irresistible; and that the verdict of the 
highest judge is irreversible (cannot be appealed).116 
All three of these distinctive activities are essential and interdependent aspects of 
a rightful condition: “each complements the others to complete the constitution 
of a state.”117 
                                                   
115 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 112.  (Ak. 6:340) 
116 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 93.  (Ak. 6:316) 
117 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 93.  (Ak. 6:316) (latin omitted) 
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The state must also be regarded as the “supreme proprietor” of the land 
within its territory.118  Kant describes this proprietorship as “an idea of the civil 
union needed to make conceivable” the totality of a state’s territory for the 
purpose of dividing it rightfully among the citizens.119  While a state supervenes 
on its territory, its proprietorship should not be mistaken for a property right.  
On the contrary, such rights are impossible: 
“In accordance with concepts of right, the supreme 
proprietor cannot have any land at all as his private property 
(for otherwise he would make himself a private person).  All 
land belongs only to the people (and indeed to the people 
taken distributively, not collectively).”120 
Recall that the concept of acquired property includes the concept of an 
independent forum for the resolution of disputes between competing claimants.  
State ownership is therefore conceptually impossible, because “if [the sovereign] 
had something of [its] own alongside others in the state, a dispute could arise 
between them and there would be no judge to settle it.”121  Katrin Flickshuh 
explains: 
[N]o private rights claimant, in raising a valid entitlement 
claim against others, can legitimately enforce this claim 
against them while remaining a constituent member of the 
rights relation.  Only an omnilateral public will—a will that is 
itself party to no rights relations—can act as authoritative 
                                                   
118 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 99.  (Ak. 6:323) 
119 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 122.  (Ak. 6:324)  This somewhat opaque argument 
follows from Kant’s metaphysical view that space, as such, must be conceived of 
as a whole that may be divided rather than as an infinite number of parts that 
may be aggregated.  See Critique of Pure Reason, p. 528.  (A524/B552) 
120 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 99.  (Ak. 6:324) 
121 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 99.  (Ak. 6:324) 
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enforcer of coercive universal law in relation to all claimants 
simultaneously.122 
While the state can have no private rights, it has instead public right:  “the 
right of command over the people, to whom all external things belong (the right 
to assign to each what is his).”123  As proprietor of the land, the Kantian state 
divides territory that was previously united by its authority into private spaces, 
but it also retains residual spaces that are not private.  The state’s right with 
respect to these spaces is not that of a property owner, who has “a right to a 
thing.”  Rather, the “right of command” is a right to make laws regulating the 
conduct of persons.124  
The state’s status as supreme proprietor of the land authorizes it to enact 
laws that impose taxes on private ownership of land, excise taxes, and import 
duties.  The state is also thus authorized to “administer the state’s economy, 
finances, and police.”125  The state’s police power includes the power to regulate 
conduct in pubic spaces for the purpose of securing “public security, 
convenience, and decency; for the government’s business of guiding people by 
laws is made easier when the feeling for decency, as negative taste, is not 
deadened by what offends the moral sense, such as begging, uproar on the 
streets, stenches, and public prostitution.”126 
                                                   
122 Katrin Flikschuh, “Reason, Right, and Revolution: Kant and Locke,” 
Philosophy & Public Affairs 36 (2008): 375-404, p. 392. 
123 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 99.  (Ak. 6:324) 
124 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 99.  (Ak. 6:324) 
125 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 100.  (Ak. 6:325) 
126 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 100.  (Ak. 6:325) 
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In this chapter, I have described what I take to be the conceptual skeleton 
of Kant’s political philosophy.  Its key elements include Kant’s conceptual claim 
about the reflexivity of rights (i.e. we each have a right to engage in any action 
that is not wrong), the conception of the state’s three authorities as a priori 
necessary solutions to the problem of establishing acquired rights, and the state’s 
status as supreme proprietor of the land.  In chapter 2, I will offer a new 
interpretation of Kant’s keystone political principle, the Universal Principle of 
Right, which depends crucially on Kant’s conception of rights as reflexive.  I 
argue that any action is right if it is not wrong in either of two ways—material or 
formal—that Kant establishes elsewhere as the ways in which an action may be 
wrong.  My analysis in chapter 2 yields a novel formulation of Kant’s standard for 
formal wrongdoing.  In chapter 3, I show that, if correct, my proposed 
formulation of the standard for formal wrongdoing functions as a limiting 
principle on the criminal lawmaking authority of the state.  In chapter 4, I apply 
my conclusions in chapters 2 and 3 to the task of analyzing the state’s exercise of 
its regulatory authority in public spaces, which is predicated on the state’s status 
as supreme proprietor of the land.  I conclude that many common ordinances 
that nominally prohibit certain categories of conduct in fact function as rightful 
permissive laws, which impose taxes or fees on lawful conduct. 
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Chapter 2: Acting Rightly 
How can we tell right actions from wrong ones?  I believe that Kant’s 
Universal Principle of Right establishes a dual test for the rightness of actions, 
corresponding to the two distinct types of wrong actions that Kant describes 
elsewhere: formal wrongs and material wrongs.127  I will show that my 
interpretation better accords with Kant’s language than do alternative readings 
according to which Kant establishes a single standard, and I will argue that it is 
also more consistent with closely related elements of Kant’s political thought. 
Because we have a right to do anything that is not wrong,128 I will analyze 
formal and material wrongs, which should collectively exhaust the category of 
conduct that the Universal Principle of Right excludes.  Material wrongs are 
actions that violate the innate or acquired rights of another free agent.  Formal 
wrongs are actions that violate “the right of human beings as such” to live in a 
rightful condition.129  I will show that the wrong-making property of a material 
wrong is a property of an action’s “outer form,” while the wrong-making property 
of a formal wrong is a property of the action’s maxim—its principle of inner 
determination. 
I will draw an analogy to Kant’s account of the difference between physical 
opposition and logical opposition in Critique of Pure Reason in order to show 
that material and formal wrongs must be remedied differently.  The dual nature 
                                                   
127 Kant writes, “This distinction between what is merely formally wrong and 
what is also materially wrong has many applications in the doctrine of right.”  
Metaphysics of Morals, p. 86.  (Ak. 6:308) (footnote) 
128 See, supra, p. 7. 
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of wrongdoing complements my textual argument in favor of a two-standard 
interpretation of the Universal Principle of Right.  Finally, I will suggest that the 
meaning of Kant’s principle may be obscured by a typographical error. 
The Universal Principle of Right 
Kant presents his Universal Principle of Right as the keystone of his 
political philosophy.  By its terms, the principle articulates the standard (or 
standards) according to which actions are “right.”  Philosophers have struggled 
with its awkward and ambiguous language.130  In Mary Gregor’s popular English 
translation of The Metaphysics of Morals, the Universal Principle of Right states: 
Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone’s freedom 
in accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the 
freedom of choice of each can coexist with everyone’s 
freedom in accordance with a universal law.131 
Translated thus, the principle appears to offer two separate standards according 
to which actions are right.  In fact, this is a contested point; some Kantians read 
the principle as articulating a single standard for right conduct, in which Kant 
simply chose to rephrase a portion of his principle.132 
                                                   
129 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 86.  (Ak. 6:308) (footnote) 
130 Indeed, leading Kantians sometimes tacitly omit the principle’s second clause, 
perhaps because its language introduces confusion that they are uncertain how to 
resolve.  See for example Allen W. Wood, Kantian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), p. 215. 
131 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 24.  (Ak. 6:230) 
132 Gregor’s translation may exaggerate the principle’s appearance of articulating 
two standards because it features a compound sentence form not found in the 
original German text:  
Eine jede Handlung ist recht, die oder nach deren Maxime die Freiheit der 
Willkür eines jeden mit jedermanns Freiheit nach einem allgemeinen 
Gesetze zusammen bestehen kann. 
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Ripstein is among those who favor a unitary reading.133  He interprets the 
Universal Principle of Right like this: 
The universal principle of right demands that each person 
exercise his or her choice in ways that are consistent with the 
freedom of all others to exercise their choice.134 
Ripstein offers another, very similar formulation elsewhere: 
The Universal Principle of Right focuses only on whether a 
particular person uses external means—objects in space and 
time—in ways consistent with the freedom of others to use 
their means.135 
If, as Ripstein believes, the principle should be read to articulate one standard 
rather than two, it must be the case that the words “if [the action] can” can be 
understood to have the same meaning as the words “if on [the action’s] maxim 
the freedom of choice of each can.”  Ideally, it should also be possible to identify a 
reason why Kant would have chosen to articulate a portion of the Universal 
Principle of Right in two different ways. 
On the issue of Kant’s possible motivation to rephrase, Ripstein offers that 
Kant may have re-phrased a principle about actions in terms of maxims because 
                                                   
Immanuel Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, (Kronigsberg: Friedrich Nicolovius, 
1798).  German grammatical conventions “permit much more unity” between the 
word that is translated to “action” and the words that are translated to “on its 
maxim the freedom of choice of each” than Gregor’s translation suggests.  
Interview with Marcus Wilczek, Assistant Professor of Germanic Languages and 
Literatures, Harvard University, February 14, 2012.  Indeed, those words appear 
right next to each other in the original German, and the words that translate to 
“coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law” only appear 
once, near the end of the sentence. 
133 Arthur Ripstein writes, “I've always been a proponent of the one standard 
approach.”  Personal email, February 17, 2012. 
134 Force and Freedom, p. 35-6. 
135 Force and Freedom, p. 384. 
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“actions are always individuated by their maxims.”136  He means that it is not 
possible to identify a unitary “action” in the context of an agent’s ongoing 
activities except by reference to the agent’s maxim, because a maxim adopts 
specific means (e.g. “walk across the field”) to further a chosen end (e.g. “to see 
the sunset over the ocean”).  Kantian maxims are usually formulated thus:  “I will 
do act (A) under circumstances (C) in order to achieve end (E).”  Because the 
doctrine of right concerns only external conduct, the rightfulness of an action will 
never depend on the part of a maxim that refers only to our internal rational 
freedom: our end (E).  Ripstein is nonetheless correct that, in my continual ebb 
and flow of activity, my entire maxim, including its end, identifies a subset of my 
activity—walking across a field, for example—to evaluate, as a single action, for 
rightness or wrongness. 
Ripstein’s explanation seems plausible because his substantive point about 
the individuation of actions is correct.  However, as an interpretation of the 
Universal Principle of Right, Ripstein’s account does not explain Kant’s inclusion 
of the additional words, “the freedom of choice of each,” in his second 
formulation.  Kant’s second alternative does not merely ask whether my action, 
uniquely picked out by my maxim, can itself coexist with everyone’s freedom.  It 
asks whether “on [my] maxim the freedom of choice of each can coexist with 
everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law.”137  I believe that it makes 
more textual sense to read these words as establishing this standard:  can the 
                                                   
136 Personal email from Arthur Ripstein, received February 17, 2012.  Elsewhere, 
Ripstein writes, “What I do is individuated by my maxim”.  Force and Freedom, 
p. 381. 
137 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 24.  (Ak. 6:230) (italics added) 
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freedom of each person to choose to act on my maxim coexist with everyone’s 
freedom in accordance with a universal law?  More succinctly: could everyone be 
free if acting on my maxim was legal? 
My two-pronged interpretation of the Universal Principle of Right can 
thus be summarized as follows: 
Any action is right if 1) it can coexist with everyone’s freedom 
in accordance with a universal law, or 2) the legality of an 
action on its maxim can coexist with everyone’s freedom in 
accordance with a universal law. 
I believe that the Universal Principle of Right can be treated as a single standard 
only if these two alternatives mean the same thing, or at least generate the same 
set of right actions.   
In the remaining sections of this chapter, I will argue that closely related 
elements of Kant’s political thought are inconsistent with the possibility of a 
single-standard interpretation.  Instead, I believe that the Universal Principle of 
Right establishes two standards that track the two different ways—material and 
formal—in which actions can be wrong.  Its first prong articulates, in inverse 
form, Kant’s standard for material wrongs:  “Any action is right if it can coexist 
with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law.”  Material wrongs 
involve actions that, as Ripstein points out, are individuated by their maxims.  
Nonetheless, I will show that Ripstein’s work elsewhere proves that maxims are 
otherwise irrelevant to whether an action is a material wrong.138  It is possible to 
commit a material wrong by acting on an entirely innocent maxim. 
                                                   
138 See, infra, pp. 50-1. 
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The second prong of the Universal Principle of Right articulates, in inverse 
form, Kant’s standard for formal wrongs:  “Any action is right…if on its maxim 
the freedom of choice of each can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance 
with a universal law.”  I understand Kant to mean that any action is right if the 
legality of an action on its maxim (i.e. the “freedom of choice of each” to act “on 
its maxim”) could coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal 
law (i.e. the concept of a rightful condition).  As Kant explains in Critique of Pure 
Reason, logical opposition—negation—is the only kind of opposition that can 
exist between two concepts.139  Therefore, because this standard compares two 
concepts, an action will fail to meet it just in case there is a logical contradiction 
between them.140  I will show that my interpretation better accords with 
Ripstein’s correct view that attempted wrongs against others may be public 
crimes, even if they violate no individual’s rights, than does a unitary 
interpretation.141 
The Nature of Material Wrongs 
Material wrongs are actions that are inconsistent with the rights of one or 
more individuals.  For Kant, a rightful condition is the state in which my possible 
                                                   
139 Critique of Pure Reason, p. 369.  (A265/B321) 
140 There is no necessary conflict between my interpretation of the Universal 
Principle of Right’s second prong and, for example, Korsgaard’s “practical 
contradiction interpretation” of the Categorical Imperative as it appears in Kant’s 
formula of universal law.  Christine Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 78.  On Korsgaard’s 
interpretation of the formula of universal law, an agent must look for a 
contradiction between the instrumental principle, which is a concept, and the 
contemplated action itself, which is an object, in the context of a world in which 
the maxim of the contemplated action is universally adopted. 
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choices and your possible choices are rendered consistent with each other.  Our 
private rights must therefore be established by a careful demarkation of the 
physical world into “mine and thine.”142  We each have an innate right to our own 
bodies, and we each may also have rights of property, contract, and status that 
are specified and secured by the state.  The sum of what is rightfully yours 
constitutes the means that you have at your disposal when you exercise your free 
agency by choosing your ends.  Mulholland explains that a material wrong is 
essentially an interference with what belongs to others: “[P]ersons have certain 
things under the control of their wills (e.g., body, physical possessions, etc.).  To 
use these in a way which interferes with what others have under control of their 
wills is to coerce others.”143 
Ripstein observes that there are two ways in which I can wrong you: I can 
interfere with your use of your means, or I can use your means without your 
authorization.  The exact nature of the second kind of material wrongdoing is 
hard to describe, because the victim is often unharmed and may even be unaware 
that she has been wronged.  For example, a stranger who touches you while you 
sleep wrongs you, even though he does not harm you.  Ripstein specifies the 
wrong-making property of the action in this way:  “the person who touches you 
without your authorization uses you for a purpose that is his but not yours.”144  
He restates the same point more generally elsewhere: “The problem is not that I 
                                                   
141 Force and Freedom, p. 374.  (footnote) 
142 Pippin, p. 416. 
143 Kant’s System of Rights, p. 184. 
144 Force and Freedom, p. 47. 
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interfere with your use of your person or powers, but that I violate your 
independence by using your powers for my purposes.”145 
According to Ripstein’s formulation, the wrong-making property of a 
materially wrong action is the tortfeasor’s possession of a purpose—a purpose for 
which he uses his victim’s means—that does not also belong to the victim.146  In 
order to avoid philosophical error, it is essential to understand the way in which 
Ripstein must intend to claim that the parties to a rightful interaction must have 
the same purpose, as well as the scope of this requirement.  I will show that the 
parties to a rightful interaction must have the same purpose in a very demanding 
sense of the word “same,” but that the scope of this demanding requirement is 
quite narrow. 
There are at least two different senses in which the purposes of two people 
can be considered identical, corresponding to two ways in which, as Kant 
explains in Critique of Pure Reason, objects can be identical: conceptual and 
numerical.147  Kant illustrates this distinction with the example of two drops of 
water that are identical in shape, size, and chemical composition.  These drops 
are conceptually identical, but insofar as they exist in two different places at the 
same time, they are numerically distinct.  A single drop of water is both 
                                                   
145 Force and Freedom, p. 46. 
146 As Kant himself does, Ripstein uses the word “purpose” as a synonym for the 
more technical Kantian term, “end”—the goal (i.e. “object” or “effect”) that an 
agent acts to bring about.  Ripstein elsewhere elaborates: “In this sense, having 
means with which to pursue purposes is conceptually prior to setting those 
purposes. In the first instance, your capacity to set your own purposes just is your 
own person: your ability to conceive of ends, and whatever bodily abilities you 
have with which to pursue them. You are independent if you are the one who 
decides which purposes you will pursue.”  Force and Freedom, p. 14. 
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conceptually and numerically identical with itself.  Ripstein’s identification of the 
wrong-making property of a material wrong as “a purpose that is [the 
tortfeasor’s] but not [the victim’s]” must be understood to refer to an absence of 
something like numerical identity, and not merely to an absence of conceptual 
identity.   
To illustrate this point, suppose that Juliet becomes secretly infatuated 
with Romeo, a handsome stranger, and she resolves to ask him to come over and 
cuddle her.  She tries to send him an invitation before bedtime, but her nurse is 
unable to find Romeo in order to deliver it.  Meanwhile, Romeo, unbeknownst to 
Juliet, forms a resolution to cuddle her as soon as possible.  Because Romeo is 
extremely shy, however, he does not ask Juliet to cuddle.  Instead, he waits until 
she has fallen asleep, climbs through her window, and cuddles her gently.   
Romeo thereby commits the tort of battery.148  Battery is a material wrong 
even though the tortfeasor and victim in this case have conceptually identical 
purposes, because their purposes remain, metaphorically speaking, numerically 
distinct.  Romeo wrongs Juliet because the two of them did not “unite their wills” 
in the manner described in Chapter 1 as the form of a rightful voluntary 
transaction between individuals.149   
The strength of this requirement is not matched by its breadth, however.  
The “purpose” that Romeo and Juliet must share in order to form a “united will” 
is no broader than the terms of Juliet’s consent to the interaction itself.  This is an 
                                                   
147 Critique of Pure Reason, p. 368.  (A263-4/B319-20) 
148 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 18 (1965). 
149 See, supra, p. 18-9. 
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important point, because purposes are iterative.  Our participation in the causal 
order always has more and less immediate consequences, intended and 
unintended, as the following proverb illustrates: 
For want of a nail the shoe was lost. 
For want of a shoe the horse was lost. 
For want of a horse the rider was lost. 
For want of a rider the message was lost. 
For want of a message the battle was lost. 
For want of a battle the kingdom was lost. 
And all for the want of a horseshoe nail. 
For a patriotic groom, consciously determined to avoid this unfortunate 
sequence of events, the status of the activity of “shoeing the horse” as a means or 
end is relative.  Relative to saving the kingdom, shoeing the horse is a means.  
Relative to finding a nail, however, shoeing the horse can correctly be 
characterized as an “end” or “purpose” for which the groom acts.  Moreover, any 
activity characterized as a means is likely to be associated with multiple ends:  the 
patriotic groom seeks a nail for the purpose of shoeing the horse, but it is also 
correct to say that he seeks a nail for the purpose of saving the kingdom. 
The many private purposes of participants in a rightful interaction need 
not be identical in any way.  Indeed, they may even conflict:  a patriotic groom 
does no wrong by purchasing a nail from an enemy sympathizer, so long as he 
tells no lies.  Kant explains: 
[I]n this reciprocal relation of choice no account at all is 
taken of the matter of choice, that is, of the end each has in 
mind with the object he wants; it is not asked, for example, 
whether someone who buys goods from me for his own 
commercial use will gain by the transaction or not.  All that is 
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in question is the form in the relation of choice on the part of 
both, insofar as choice is regarded merely as free.150 
Returning to the Veronese example, suppose that Juliet’s message was 
timely delivered, and that Romeo accepted her invitation to cuddle.  However, he 
did so with an ulterior motive.  While Juliet cuddled Romeo for the private 
purpose of making him want to marry her, Romeo cuddled Juliet for the private 
purpose of making Rosaline jealous enough to agree to marry him.  The cuddling 
couple’s mutually contradictory private purposes make it the case that this 
version of Romeo is a cad, but he is not a tortfeasor.151  Although it is literally true 
that the caddish Romeo acts for “a purpose that is his but not [Juliet’s],”152 a 
correct reading of Ripstein’s formulation must specify that private purposes—
which determine whether the parties “will gain by the transaction or not”—need 
not be shared in order for an interaction to be rightful.  In Kant’s parlance, the 
parties’ personal goals are the “matter” of any interpersonal agreement, while 
only the terms of the agreement are its objective “form.” 
So far, we have seen that using another person’s means is a material wrong 
unless a certain kind of mutual intent—authorization—makes the use rightful.  
Wrongful intentions, on the other hand, are neither necessary nor sufficient to 
make any action a material wrong.  I may act with the intention of wronging you 
and yet fail to do so. For example, suppose that I decide to prevent you from 
                                                   
150 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 24.  (Ak. 6:230) 
151 Romeo’s behavior indicates a morally objectionable indifference to Juliet’s 
happiness.  The happiness of others is an end that we are morally required to 
have.  See Metaphysics of Morals, p. 151.  (Ak. 6:388) 
152 Force and Freedom, p. 47. 
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interviewing for a job I want by stealing the spark plugs from your car, so that 
you cannot drive to the interview.  Fortunately for you, I misread my license plate 
in the dark and mistakenly remove the spark plugs from my own car instead.  
Despite my best efforts, I have not wronged you because I have not interfered 
with your use of your means, nor have I used your means without your consent.153 
Conversely, I can wrong you quite by accident if I fail to realize that the 
means that I am using belong to you.  As Ripstein explains, the tort of innocent 
trespass is an example of a private wrong that no one undertakes to commit.154  I 
may intend to build a treehouse on my own property, but because I am 
misreading my map, it happens that I mistakenly build it on your land instead.  
By doing so, I have wronged you even though I had no idea that the land on 
which I built my treehouse was yours.  All that I must do in order to wrong you is 
interfere with your use of your means, or use your means without your consent. 
There is one limitation on inadvertent material wrongdoing involving 
another person’s means: in order to wrong you, I must do something.  In other 
words, I must take some action.155  Building a treehouse is an action, defined as 
something that I, considered as an agent, cause.  It can therefore be a material 
wrong even if I am unaware of the facts that make my action wrong.  By contrast, 
if I build my treehouse on my own land, but then a large bear escapes from the 
local zoo and pushes my treehouse off its perch and onto your property, I have 
                                                   
153 Crimes of attempt are not material wrongs, but I will show that they are formal 
wrongs.  See, infra, p. 54-6. 
154 See Arthur Ripstein, “As If It Had Never Happened,” 48 William & Mary Law 
Review 48 (2007): 1957, p. 1991.  (hereafter As If It Never Happened) 
155 See Force and Freedom, p. 381. 
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not wronged you, because I have not “used” anything of yours without your 
permission.  Your property right just is the exclusive right to choose whether and 
how your means are used, and the concept of “use” contains the idea of an agent 
operating as a cause.  Because my agency was not active in the escaped bear case, 
I did not violate your rights.156 
The Nature of Formal Wrongs 
Formal wrongs are not, per se, wrongs against other individuals, although 
many wrong actions are both formally and materially wrong.  Rather, formal 
wrongs violate “the right of human beings as such” to live in a rightful condition.  
In the state of nature, we commit a formal wrong (which Kant colorfully 
characterizes as “wrong in the highest degree”) by “willing to be and to remain in 
a condition that is not rightful.”157  In a civil condition, formal wrongs are called 
“public crimes.”158  A public crime is “a transgression of public law that makes 
someone who commits it unfit to be a citizen…because they endanger the 
commonwealth and not just an individual citizen.”159 
Formal wrongs require a type of intentionality that material wrongs do 
not, which is reflected in the maxim of the action.  Kant writes that any “deed 
contrary to duty is called a transgression,” a category that includes both material 
and formal wrongs, but an “unintentional transgression which can still be 
                                                   
156 In legal terms, this is the difference between “strict liability” and “absolute 
liability.” 
157 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 86.  (Ak. 6:307-8) 
158 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 105.  (Ak. 6:331) 
159 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 105.  (Ak. 6:331) 
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imputed to an agent is a mere fault.”160   The tort of innocent trespass, which I 
committed when I mistakenly built my treehouse on your property, is an example 
of a “mere fault.”  Material wrongs “can still be imputed to the agent” in a civil 
lawsuit if they are innocently committed, but such mistakes are not crimes, 
because their maxims—for example, “I will build a treehouse on my property in 
order to provide my children with a place to play and exercise”—are 
unobjectionable.  As Kant writes, a material wrong “does not always presuppose 
that there is in the subject a principle for such an act.”161   
By contrast, “an intentional transgression (i.e., one accompanied by 
consciousness of its being a transgression) is called a crime.”162  In the state of 
nature, it is “willing to be and to remain in” a non-rightful condition that 
constitutes a formal wrong.163  Remaining in the state of nature because you can’t 
figure out how to exit it is not wrong, merely unfortunate.  In a civil condition, a 
“guilty mind”—mens rea—is analogously a traditional element of any public 
crime.  Kant explains that a common criminal can be distinguished from an 
anarchist by the different maxims on which they act, but that both commit formal 
wrongs.  On the standard that I have proposed as the correct one, this is the case 
because the freedom to choose to act on either type of maxim (i.e. the legality of 
                                                   
160 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 16.  (Ak. 6:224)  (Latin parenthetical omitted) 
161 Immanuel Kant, “On a Supposed Right to Lie Because of Philanthropic 
Concerns,” in James W. Ellington, ed., Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals 
with On a Supposed Right to Lie Because of Philanthropic Concerns, 3rd Edition 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1993), p. 67.  (hereafter Supposed Right to 
Lie)  (Ak. 429) 
162 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 16.  (Ak. 6:224)  (Latin parenthetical omitted) 
163 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 86.  (Ak. 6:307-8) (emphasis added) 
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an action on the maxim) would be incompatible with everyone’s freedom in 
accordance with a universal law (i.e. the concept of a rightful condition).  Kant 
writes: 
The transgressor can commit his misdeed either according to 
a maxim of a presumed objective rule (as universally valid), 
or as an exception to the rule (as giving oneself dispensation 
from the rule on occasion). In the latter case he only deviates 
from the law (although intentionally). He can also detest his 
transgression and, without formally renouncing his 
obedience of the law, only wish to circumvent it. In the 
former case, by contrast, he rejects the authority of the law 
itself, the validity of which he cannot, however, reasonably 
deny, and he makes it into a rule that he act against it. His 
maxim is thus opposed to the law not merely as lacking 
(negatively), but rather as contrary to it or, as one says, 
diametrically opposed to it, as a contradiction (hostile to it, 
as it were). As far as we understand, the commission of such 
a transgression of a formal (completely fruitless) malice is 
impossible for human beings and yet not to be ignored in a 
system of morality (even though as the mere idea of the most 
extreme evil).164 
A common criminal merely “deviates from the law (although 
intentionally)” by making herself an exception to it.  She might act on the maxim:  
“I will steal from others in order to increase my wealth.”  Such a criminal does not 
wish to live in a lawless condition.  Indeed, her purpose of increasing her own 
wealth presupposes the security of her own rights even as she violates the rights 
of others.  When she acts on her criminal maxim, she commits a formal wrong 
because the concept of legal theft contradicts the concept of everyone’s freedom 
in accordance with a universal law.  This is the case because coercive enforcement 
                                                   
164 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 97.  (Ak. 6:320)  (footnote) 
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is a constitutive element of any property right, and the concept of property rights 
is contained in the concept of a rightful condition.165 
The anarchist, by contrast, “rejects the authority of the law itself” because 
he does not count on the continued obedience of others in order to remain secure 
his own rights.  He might act on the maxim, “I will use deadly force in order to 
defend myself from police officers who try to arrest me,” fully acknowledging that 
others may do the same, and perhaps hoping that they will.166  When the 
anarchist acts on his maxim, he commits a formal wrong nonetheless, because 
the concept of legal resistance to executive branch officials contradicts the 
concept of a rightful condition.167  Recall Kant’s a priori derivation of the state’s 
necessary powers:  “the executive power of the supreme ruler is irresistible.”168  
Ripstein correctly treats this is a conceptual rather than empirical claim—it may 
be physically possible to resist executive branch officials, but it is not legally 
possible to do so in a rightful condition.169  The concept of legal coercion of 
executive branch officials contradicts the concept of a rightful condition, because 
                                                   
165 See, supra, pp. 16-8. 
166 At the level of personal morality, the anarchist’s maxim is immoral, not 
because it is internally contradictory, but because it creates a “contradiction in 
the will”: it is inconsistent with another purpose—external freedom—that the 
anarchist is rationally required to have, even if he doesn’t actually have it. 
167 The state’s executive authority supplies the element of “assurance” contained 
in the concept of an acquired right.  See, supra, p. 26-7.  I will argue later that 
Kant’s passionate condemnations of any “resistance” to the state should be read 
as condemnations of this type of formal wrong rather than as arguments in favor 
of a moral obligation to obey unjust statutes. 
168 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 93.  (Ak. 6:316) 
169 Force and Freedom, p. 314. 
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the latter concept contains the irresistible coercive power of the executive.  It is 
therefore a public crime to resist arrest. 
The above examples focus on formally wrong actions that also violate the 
rights of individuals to property or physical safety, and therefore happen to be 
material wrongs as well.  Not all formal wrongs are also material wrongs, 
however.  Kant acknowledges this fact in his essay, “On a Supposed Right to Lie 
Because of Philanthropic Concerns” (hereafter Supposed Right to Lie), when he 
writes that an action “which avoids [civil liability] only by accident can also be 
condemned as wrong even by external [criminal] laws.”170  In passing, Ripstein 
correctly indicates that crimes of attempt—such as attempted murder or 
attempted theft—may be crimes even when they do not succeed in violating 
anyone’s individual rights.171   
I believe that such attempts are formal wrongs, because the concept of a 
legal action on the maxim of an attempted crime contradicts the concept of a 
rightful condition.  For example, suppose that the above-described anarchist is 
nearsighted.  When the police arrive, the anarchist mistakenly picks up his child’s 
bubble gun rather than his own firearm, points it at the police, and pulls the 
trigger.  Only bubbles emerge from the gun, and even the bubbles don’t hit the 
arresting officers.  Assuming that the officers either do not see the gun or 
immediately recognize it as a toy (otherwise gun wielding may be a tortious 
threat), the anarchist’s action is not a material wrong.  Nonetheless, his 
                                                   
170 Supposed Right to Lie, p. 65.  (Ak. 426-7) 
171 Ripstein writes, “If I attempt to wrong you but fail, I may commit a crime, but 
(unless your apprehension of a battery makes my act an assault) I do not commit 
a private wrong against you.”  Force and Freedom, p. 374.  (footnote) 
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attempted homicide is what Kant calls a “public crime”—a formal wrong—
because his maxim is identical to what it would have been if he had actually shot 
the officers. 
My failed attempt to prevent you from interviewing for a job I want by 
stealing your spark plugs is likewise a formal wrong.172  I accidentally removed 
the spark plugs from my own car instead, so I did not succeed in wronging you.  I 
nonetheless committed the crime of attempted theft because, in Kant’s words, I 
failed to wrong you “only by accident.”173  The maxim on which I acted was the 
same as it would have been had I succeeded:  “I will steal my neighbor’s spark 
plugs in order to prevent her from interviewing for the job I want.”  My action 
was wrong because the concept of legal spark plug theft from job market 
competitors logically contradicts the concept of a rightful condition. 
Significantly, under the standard that I have articulated for a formal 
wrongs based on the language of the Universal Principle of Right, the legality of 
some act need result in a return to the state of nature in order for a criminal 
sanction to be justified.  For example, a statute that specifically legalized the theft 
of spark plugs from job market competitors would not bring down the 
government.  It would, however, be inconsistent with the concept of a rightful 
condition, of which the enforceability of property rights is a constitutive element.  
This feature of my interpretation reflects Kant’s commitment to the 
unconditionality of rights, regardless of empirical circumstances. 
                                                   
172 See, supra, pp. 50-1. 
173 Supposed Right to Lie, p. 65.  (Ak. 426-7) 
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In this way, my formulation of Kant’s standard for formal wrongs usefully 
differs from Jacob Weinrib’s formulation, proffered in his essay, “The Juridical 
Significance of Kant’s ‘Supposed Right to Lie.’”  Weinrib states that a formal 
wrong in a civil condition “consists of bringing about the dissolution of the 
rightful condition into the violence of the state of nature.”174  Dissolving the 
rightful condition, Weinrib points out, would eliminate the “totality” of the 
people as a whole, united under laws.175  Weinrib’s formulation is similar to some 
of Kant’s own language.  Most notably, Kant characterizes public crimes as those 
which “endanger the commonwealth.”  This could be taken to mean that formal 
wrongs are just those acts that threaten the ongoing existence of the government.  
Weinrib offers his formulation of Kant’s standard for formal wrongs for the 
purpose of explaining Kant’s notorious conclusion, in Supposed Right to Lie, that 
it is wrong to lie to a murderer in order to save the life of an innocent friend.   
I agree with Weinrib that Kant’s essay should be understood as an 
argument for the proposition that lying is a formal wrong.  However, I believe 
that Weinrib’s formulation of Kant’s standard for formal wrongs imperfectly 
grounds his essentially correct thesis.  Weinrib’s version of this standard is 
nominally met just in case there is a causal relationship between a particular 
action and the ultimate dissolution of the state.  One problem with this approach 
is that no one lie is remotely likely to actually trigger a descent into anarchy.  
Weinrib’s standard can therefore be nominally met only by interpreting Kant’s 
                                                   
174 Jacob Weinrib, “The Juridical Significance of Kant’s ‘Supposed Right to Lie,’” 
Kantian Review 13 (2008):141-169, p. 150.  (hereafter Juridical Significance) 
175 Juridical Significance, p. 148. 
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cryptic remarks as a series of conjectures about the possible cumulative effects of 
many lies: a fatally dysfunctional political process, or a collapse of confidence in 
legal contracts.  Weinrib’s imperfect formulation thus threatens to saddle him 
with, as Ripstein wrote in a different context, “the need to concoct remote harms 
to explain ordinary wrongs.”176   
I do not believe that Weinrib intends to make a causal argument, but 
because his formulation of Kant’s standard for formal wrongs evaluates actions 
themselves rather than the legality of actions on particular maxims, and because 
his formulation uses causal language, I am not sure what kind of contradiction, if 
not a practical contradiction, Weinrib means to identify.  Fortunately, my 
proposed alternative formulation of Kant’s standard for formal wrongs can 
adequately show how Kant reaches his implausible conclusion in Supposed Right 
to Lie that a lie is always a formal wrong.  On my account, Kant can reach his 
result if he concludes that the concept of a legal action on the maxim “I will lie to 
a murderer in order to save my friend’s life” logically contradicts the concept of a 
rightful condition.  The best argument for this conclusion has several stages. 
First, Kant argues that the law must impose civil liability on those who lie 
for any harm that results from their lies.  Kant must therefore believe that a 
failure to impose civil liability in such cases would inadequately secure our 
private rights.  Recall that freedom is “independence from being constrained by 
another’s choice.”177  To preserve my independence, the question of what means I 
                                                   
176 Arthur Ripstein, “In Extremis,” Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 2 (2005): 
415-434, p. 417.  (footnote) (hereafter In Extremis) 
177 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 30.  (Ak. 6:237) 
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have available to me must be settled before I choose to act, since the amount and 
type of means that I have determine which choices I can rightfully make.  This is 
why it is essential to my freedom that I have legal “assurance” that my private 
rights are secure.  Both negligence and reckless endangerment are sometimes 
material wrongs, because both kinds of acts sometimes deprive others of their 
means.  However, the circumstances under which these two kinds of acts—
negligence and reckless endangerment—are material wrongs differ.  Relatedly, 
reckless endangerment is also a formal wrong, while mere negligence is not.  
Explaining these differences will illuminate the analogy that I will subsequently 
draw between lies and acts of reckless endangerment in what I regard as the most 
plausible reconstruction of Kant’s argument in Supposed Right to Lie. 
Mere negligence is not a formal wrong, because a negligent actor may act 
on an unobjectionable maxim.  For example, a philosopher may act on the 
maxim: “I will drive to the store to get some milk.”  On the way, she may become 
so distracted by thoughts about Kantian political philosophy that she fails to 
notice a red light and hits another vehicle.  The distracted philosopher has not 
committed a formal wrong, because the concept of a legal action in accordance 
with her maxim does not logically contradict the concept of a rightful condition. 
Nonetheless, the distracted philosopher is civilly liable for the accident, 
because the law must secure our access to our means by legally enforcing an 
affirmative standard of reasonable care in situations in which we causally interact 
with each other.  To accomplish this, the civil law traditionally holds negligent 
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actors responsible only for the foreseeable results of their negligence.178  This 
limitation reflects the fact that wrongdoers such as the philosopher are liable only 
in virtue of what they failed to do: pay adequate attention.  Because an 
“unforeseeable” harm just is a harm that no one can undertake to avoid, 
unforeseeable harms caused by negligent actions are harms, but not wrongs.  
Imposing civil liability on merely negligent individuals for unforeseeable harms 
would burden our freedom to go about the ordinary activities of life. 
By contrast, an act of reckless endangerment is a formal wrong, because 
the danger that these acts create is intentional, and is therefore included in the 
content of their maxims.179  For example, I might act on the maxim, “I will drive 
through town blindfolded in order to gain admission to a fraternity.”  
Endangering pedestrians is not a purpose for which I am acting, but I know 
perfectly well that danger to pedestrians is an intrinsic feature of my chosen 
action.  For this reason, the concept of a legal action in accordance with my 
maxim logically contradicts the concept of a rightful condition, because security 
in our private rights is constitutive of our freedom.  It is because acts of reckless 
endangerment are formally wrong that they traditionally entail civil liability for 
all resulting losses, not merely the foreseeable ones.180  Imposing civil liability for 
the unforeseeable losses that result from a criminal act does not burden freedom, 
because a criminal act is not something that anyone has a preexisting right to do. 
                                                   
178 See for example Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 344 (N.Y. 
1928) (“The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed.”) 
179 Indeed, reckless endangerment is a crime in many jurisdictions.  See Model 
Penal Code § 211.2 (1985). 
180 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 501 (1965). 
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In light of the foregoing, while I am not convinced that Kant makes his 
case, I believe that the best reconstruction of his argument in Supposed Right to 
Lie is this:  lies are a kind of reckless endangerment.  Lies are unlike mere 
negligence, because the wrong-making property of a lie is in the maxim of the 
liar’s action:  he intentionally redirects the actions of another person, knowing 
that he will be unable to control the nature or results of those redirected 
actions.181  The success of Kant’s argument, on my reading, depends on the 
inference that this redirection amounts to a reckless usurpation of another 
person’s agency, a bit like forcing someone to relinquish the driver’s seat in his 
own car so that you can drive it blindfolded instead.  It is for this reason, I 
believe, that Kant could have concluded that lies were formal wrongs.  If one 
accepts the characterization of lying as a form of reckless endangerment, then the 
concept of a legal right to lie logically contradicts the concept of everyone’s 
freedom in accordance with a universal law, because reckless actions 
intentionally undermine our security in our private rights, which is a constitutive 
element of a rightful condition. 
Remedies and Punishments 
I have shown that material and formal wrongs have different natures.  The 
wrong-making property of a material wrong is a property of the wrongdoer’s 
                                                   
181 Because a lie is an intentional wrong, Kant writes that a liar is liable for all of 
the harmful consequences of his act, no matter how unforeseeable they are:  
“whoever tells a lie, regardless of how good his intentions may be, must answer 
for the consequences resulting therefrom even before a civil tribunal and must 
pay the penalty for them, regardless of how unforeseen those consequences 
might be.”  Supposed Right to Lie, p. 65.  (Ak. 427)  (emphasis added)  This is the 
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action: her unauthorized use of (or interference with) someone else’s means.  The 
wrong-making property of a formal wrong is a property of the maxim on which 
the wrongdoer acts: a logical contradiction between the concept of a legal action 
in accordance with that maxim and the concept of a rightful condition.  The state 
must therefore respond to these two different types of wrongs in different ways.  
Material wrongs are corrected in civil court by means of remedies, while formal 
wrongs are corrected in criminal court by means of punishments.182 
I believe that the way in which remedies and punishments are analogous 
but distinct can be understood with the help of Kant’s analysis of the concept of 
opposition in the Critique of Pure Reason.183  Kant distinguishes between two 
kinds of opposition:  logical opposition, which is a relation between concepts, and 
“real” (i.e. “phenomenal”) opposition, which is an analogous relation between 
(among other things) the physical forces that operate on objects.  Because 
material wrongs are physical in nature, they can be corrected only by real 
opposition.  Because formal wrongs are conceptual in nature, they can be 
                                                   
same civil damages rule that traditionally applies to acts of reckless 
endangerment. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 501 (1965). 
182 Kant writes, “A transgression of public law that makes someone who commits 
it unfit to be a citizen is called a crime (crimen) simply but is also called a public 
crime (crimen publicum); so the first (private crime) is brought before a civil 
court, the latter before a criminal court.”  Metaphysics of Morals, p. 105.  (Ak. 
6:331) 
183 Critique of Pure Reason, p. 369.  (A265/B321)  Ripstein refers to this analysis 
to make a different claim about the difference between external freedom and 
morality.  Force and Freedom, p. 376.  In the course of this discussion, Ripstein 
appears to me to assume that all wrongs, both formal and material, are corrected 
by means of real opposition—a supposition at odds with my claim here that 
formal wrongs can only be corrected by means of logical opposition. 
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corrected only by a punishment that is determined by a maxim that logically 
contradicts (and therefore negates) the wrongdoer’s maxim.  
Civil remedies, at least ideally, stand in a relation of real opposition to 
material wrongs.  Kant describes real opposition as the relation between two 
opposing forces which, acting on the same object, “partly or wholly destroy the 
consequence of the other, like two moving forces in the same straight line that 
either push or pull a point in opposed directions.”184  In a game of tug-of-war, for 
example, if I pull the rope East with the same force that you pull it West, no net 
physical movement will result, but our activity of pulling continues to exist 
(which will be clear to us as it tires us out).  This is the way in which civil 
remedies oppose material wrongs: they restore to a victim the means to which 
she has a right, effectively imposing an equal and opposite force.   
In an essay titled, “As If It Never Happened,” Ripstein offers a detailed 
Kantian analysis of civil damages rules, which is consistent with their status as a 
kind of “real opposition.”185  The traditional principles governing civil damages, 
he argues, are best understood as applications of the Kantian concept of private 
right, according to which we each have a right to exclusively determine how our 
means will be used.  The simplest kind of remedy for a material wrong is a court 
order that physically restores a person’s external means to them.  For example, a 
civil court may require a squatter to leave my property or a thief to return 
something that she has stolen. 
                                                   
184 Critique of Pure Reason, p. 369.  (A265/B321) 
185 See generally As If It Never Happened. 
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Even when these remedies are possible, they are not necessarily sufficient, 
because the wronged party was still deprived of her means for a period of time 
during which she might have used them to generate additional means.  For 
example, if a thief steals my car, I may be unable to get to work as a result.  In 
such cases, the court can only fully restore to me the means to which I am entitled 
by ordering the thief to replace the additional means that she indirectly deprived 
me of: my lost wages.186  Under common law, those lost wages are considered 
consequential damages, and I am entitled to recover them.187 
Often, it is impossible for a wrongdoer to physically return the means that 
he has taken from another person.  For example, a thief who stole your car might 
destroy it, abandon it, or sell it before he is caught.  In cases in which the physical 
restoration of your means is impossible, the court calculates the value, to you, of 
those means, considered as means.188  In most cases, this value will be the same 
as the market value of the thing you were deprived of, for example, the market 
price of a car of the same make, model, and condition as the one that was 
                                                   
186 See As If It Never Happened, p. 1967. 
187 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 906 (1965). 
188 A civil court does not consider factors like sentimental attachment when 
valuing property for the purpose of civil damages.  Ripstein offers a very Kantian 
explanation for this: “Compensatory damages give you back the means you had. 
Your happiness, considered as such, is not among the means you use to set and 
pursue your purposes, even if, for example, your mental health could be 
described as something you use in that way. That is why someone who makes you 
unhappy without injuring your person or property is not liable, even if you are 
more successful at whatever you do when you are happy.”  As If It Never 
Happened, p. 1984. 
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taken.189  The idea is that you can use the money to replace the car, or you can use 
it for something else, as you would have if you had chosen to sell the car.   
In unusual cases, the value of your means, as means, to you—that is, in 
terms of your ability to use them to acquire additional means—may be much 
higher than the market value of those means.  For example, a jockey may own a 
horse with whom she wins lucrative races because of their close personal 
relationship.  The market value of her horse may be much lower than its earning 
potential for her.  If an envious competitor poisons her horse, the jockey will be 
entitled to damages equal to the amount of her lost earning potential, because the 
underlying principle of the civil law is to restore to the plaintiff all the means to 
which she would be entitled if the wrong action had never happened.  This is why 
Kant’s “real opposition” model is an apt analogy: a remedy for a material wrong 
restores the victim’s means, considered as means, to her control. 
Criminal punishments, by contrast, do not eliminate the effects of bad acts 
on the means of victims.  Instead, they re-assert the authority of the state, which 
is why criminal prosecutors represent the state rather than any private party.  
Recall that a formal wrong is conceptual in nature:  its wrong-making property is 
a feature of the maxim of a criminal action rather than a feature of the action’s 
physical “outer form.”  This is why crimes of attempt are formal wrongs even 
when they are not material wrongs.  Concepts can’t move in a direction in space, 
as physical objects can, so they cannot be opposed with an equal and opposite 
                                                   
189 See As If It Never Happened, p. 1971. 
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force.  Instead, they are opposed by negation.190  For example, the logical 
opposite of the concept “West” is not “East.”  Rather, it is simply “not West.”191 
I have claimed that an action is a formal wrong just in case the concept of a 
legal action on its maxim logically contradicts the concept of a rightful condition.  
The fact that Kantian punishments invert criminal maxims to generate their 
logical opposites supports this claim.  A criminal wills a maxim according to 
which she is free and others are not free.  Her punishment negates both aspects 
of her compound proposition by making it the case that she is not free and others 
are free.  The most fitting punishment for any crime deprives a criminal of 
freedom in a similar way, and to a similar extent, as her crime deprived others of 
freedom.  Kant writes: 
[W]hatever undeserved evil you inflict upon another within 
the people, you inflict upon yourself.  If you insult him, you 
insult yourself; if you steal from him, you steal from yourself; 
if you strike him, you strike yourself; if you kill him, you kill 
yourself.192 
This retributive standard must be applied by a court, which cannot 
rightfully “inflict whatever punishments [it] chooses” for crimes, because such 
discretion “would be literally contrary to the concept of punitive justice.”193  Nor 
                                                   
190 Two propositions are logically opposed “insofar as the sphere of one judgment 
excludes that of the other, yet [they have] at the same time the relation of 
community, insofar as the judgments together exhaust the sphere of cognition 
proper.”  Critique of Pure Reason, p. 208.  (A73/B99) 
191 Kant offers as an example the proposition, “the soul is not mortal,” which 
simply means that the soul is undying, and therefore “immortal.”  Critique of 
Pure Reason, p. 207.  (A72/B97) 
192 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 105.  (Ak. 6:332) 
193 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 130.  (Ak. 6:363) 
  68 
can the court select punishments on the basis of their likely deterrent or 
rehabilitative effects, for such a utilitarian approach would treat the criminal “as 
a means to promote some other good for the criminal or for civil society.”194 
Kant’s colorful rhetoric on this subject is not effortlessly reconciled with 
the actual practices of modern Western legal systems, which use incarceration to 
punish almost everything, and a thorough analysis of the manner in which this 
can be best accomplished is beyond the scope of this project.195  Briefly, however, 
one retributive justification for prison is that it deprives a prisoner of the full 
enjoyment of nearly all of his freedoms for a period of time, thereby broadly 
meeting Kant’s standard.  For example, Kant writes, “whoever steals makes the 
property of everyone else insecure and therefore deprives himself (by the 
principle of retribution) of security in any possible property.”196  As Arthur 
Ripstein observes, a prisoner lacks access to all real property and most personal 
property during her period of confinement, and any personal belongings that she 
is permitted to use in prison are not enjoyed as property—that is, not rightfully, 
but only at the discretion of the prison warden.197   
Even Kant concedes that literal retribution is beyond the rightful power of 
the state if the violent or degrading nature of a crime would render its visitation 
                                                   
194 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 105.  (Ak. 6:331) 
195 For a helpful analysis of three different ways in which Kant’s proportionality 
principle can be interpreted, see Jeffrie G Murphy, “Does Kant Have a Theory of 
Punishment?” Columbia Law Review 87 (1987): 509-32, 530-2. 
196 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 106.  (Ak. 6:333) 
197 See Arthur Ripstein, “Hindering a Hindrance to Freedom,” Jahrbuch fur 
Recht und Ethic 16 (2008): 227-250, 246. 
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back on the perpetrator “a punishable crime against humanity as such.”198  In 
such cases, a punishment should fit the crime “if not in terms of its letter at least 
in terms of its spirit.”199 
Kant’s Typo 
In this chapter, I have analyzed Kant’s language in the Universal Principle 
of Right, and I have argued that it articulates two separate standards for the 
rightness of actions.  I have then shown that these two standards, as I understand 
them, effectively track the two types of wrongdoing—material and formal—that 
Kant identifies in his political writings.  I have shown that not all material wrongs 
are formal wrongs, and that not all formal wrongs are material wrongs.  I have 
also shown that the wrong-making property of a materially wrong action is a 
property of its “outer form”—the physical act.  By contrast, the wrong-making 
property of a formal wrong is a property of its “principle of inner 
determination”—its maxim.  Specifically an action is a formal wrong just in case 
the concept of a legal action on its maxim logically contradicts the concept of 
everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law (i.e. a rightful condition). 
If my account of the differences between material and formal wrongdoing 
is correct, I believe that it is highly unlikely that Kant intended to articulate a 
single standard for the rightness of actions in the Universal Principle of Right.  
What single standard could identify both physical and conceptual 
                                                   
198 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 130.  (Ak. 6:363)  Most contemporary readers 
would interpret this standard more stringently than Kant did.  Kant argued that 
raping a rapist would violate this standard, but that castration would be an 
appropriate punishment.  Ibid. 
199 Ibid. 
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incompatibilities, or could otherwise correctly determine the contents to two only 
partially overlapping sets of wrong actions?  If Ripstein’s unitary interpretation 
appears to accomplish either goal, it does so only by using ambiguous language 
that must be interpreted in two different ways in order to plausibly identify these 
different types of wrongs.  Ripstein’s formulation is as follows:   
The universal principle of right demands that each person 
exercise his or her choice in ways that are consistent with the 
freedom of all others to exercise their choice.200 
In the context of material wrongs, Ripstein’s formulation can be 
interpreted in a way that makes sense: I can’t “choose” to use my body or 
property in “ways” that are physically inconsistent with everyone else’s freedom 
to choose what they will do with theirs.  Physical coercion, trespass, theft, and 
property destruction are all ways of using my body that would be wrong under 
this test.  By specifying that the consistency in question is physical, this reading of 
Ripstein’s test takes the word “ways” to refer to my physical manner of engaging 
with my means, which may in turn interfere with your means.  This 
interpretation is plausible in part because it correctly establishes the wrongful 
nature of torts such as innocent trespass, which are committed mistakenly on the 
basis of an unobjectionable maxim.  The sense in which I “choose” to use my 
means in these wrongful “ways” is that I choose to engage in the physical action 
that constitutes the material wrong.  The word “choose” does not reflect any 
knowledge that my act constitutes a transgression.  My wrong action is, as 
                                                   
200 Force and Freedom, p. 35-6. 
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Ripstein points out, individuated by my maxim, but my maxim is otherwise 
irrelevant. 
So understood, however, Ripstein’s interpretation of the Universal 
Principle of Right cannot correctly classify attempted crimes as formal wrongs.  
Recall my attempted theft of your spark plugs:  I undertake to steal the spark 
plugs from your car in order to prevent you from interviewing for a job I want.  
However, I misread my license plate in the dark and remove the spark plugs from 
my own car instead.  If the “way” in which I use my means is understood to be my 
physical engagement with my own spark plugs, it is difficult to see how that 
physical engagement itself could be wrong.  Suppose I removed my own spark 
plugs because I am prone to sleepwalking, and I wanted to guard against the 
possibility of a dangerous, involuntary midnight drive.  Although my physical 
engagement with my means would be identical, my action would not be wrong.   
But the wrongful nature of my attempted crime can’t be located in the 
referent of the word “choose” either, because we have already determined that 
this test as applied to material wrongs only interprets the word “choose” to 
require that a particular activity was an action at all.  The requirement that I 
“choose” to use my means in a particular way is satisfied in the case of innocent 
trespass just so long as, for example, my physical activity of building a treehouse 
qualifies as an action.  “Choose” can’t denote knowledge of the wrong-making 
property of my action when the test applies to formal wrongs while denoting no 
such thing when the same test applies to material wrongs.  Not if this test is truly 
a single standard. 
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Some scholars who believe that the Universal Principle of Right articulates 
a single standard may be misled by a fragment of text that Kant refers to as the 
“universal law of right” three paragraphs later.  It is tempting to try to read this 
“universal law of right” as a restatement of the Universal Principle of Right.  Kant 
states: 
Thus the universal law of right, so act externally that the free 
use of your choice can coexist with the freedom of everyone 
in accordance with a universal law, is indeed a law that lays 
an obligation on me, but it does not at all expect, far less 
demand, that I myself should limit my freedom to those 
conditions just for the sake of this obligation; instead, reason 
says only that freedom is limited to those conditions in 
conformity with the idea of it and that it may also be actively 
limited by others.201 
However, as Mulholland observes, the grammatical form of the Universal 
Principle of Right is descriptive; it simply identifies the conditions under which 
an action is right.202  By contrast, the “universal law of right” has an imperative 
form: “so act externally that the free use of your choice can coexist with the 
freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law.”203  This grammatical 
difference is reinforced by the fact that the German words Prinzip (translated as 
“principle” in the Universal Principle of Right) and Rechtsgesetz (translated to 
“law” in the “universal law of right”) do not have identical meanings.  A 
                                                   
201 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 24-5.  (Ak. 6:231) 
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203 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 24-5.  (Ak. 6:231)  As Kant writes, “The 
representation of an objective principle, insofar as it is necessitating for the will, 
is called a command (of reason), and the formula of the command is called an 
imperative.”  Groundwork, p. 24.  (Ak. 4:413) 
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“principle,” for Kant, need not be a practical (i.e. prescriptive) principle.  Kant’s 
“principles of pure understanding” in Critique of Pure Reason, for example, are 
rules for cognition, not rules for action.204  By contrast, the word Rechtsgesetz 
combines the German word for “law” (Gesetz) with the German word for “right” 
(Recht).  I believe that it is consistent with the imperative form of the “universal 
law of right” to conclude that Kant is using this word specifically to denote a 
practical law—a law of action.205 
This distinction matters, because while a juridical law can’t require us to 
adopt any particular maxim, the only way in which it can prospectively constrain 
our actions is by constraining the set of maxims on which we may act.  Mary 
Gregor explains: 
Since juridical laws require that certain actions take place, 
they must require that we have certain maxims, because 
human action is action on a maxim.  They do not require that 
we adopt the formal maxim of lawfulness but only that the 
material maxims which we have be such that we can act 
upon them without violating the freedom of others.206  
 A practical law of right must therefore command us not to act on criminal 
maxims (i.e. it must command us not to commit formal wrongs).  With this in 
                                                   
204 Critique of Pure Reason, p. 388.  (A301/B357) 
205 Kant considers practical laws to be a subset of principles:  “A principle that 
makes certain actions duties is a practical law.”  Metaphysics of Morals, p. 17.  
(Ak. 6:225) 
206 Mary J. Gregor, The Laws of Freedom: A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying 
the Categorical Imperative, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963), p. 41.  (footnote)  
(hereafter Laws of Freedom)  I believe that Gregor’s meaning would have been 
clearer if she had put the word “only” in between “have” and “certain” in the first 
sentence.  Her subsequent sentence makes it clear that she means that the set of 
possible lawful maxims is restricted by the juridical law, and not that the juridical 
law can require us to adopt a specific maxim. 
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mind, I understand Kant’s “universal law of right”—“so act externally that the 
free use of your choice can coexist with the freedom of everyone in accordance 
with a universal law”—to command us to adopt only maxims of action (i.e. 
principles of choice) that can be freely chosen consistently with everyone’s 
freedom in accordance with a universal law.207  The rest of the sentence explains 
that the juridical law enforces this command externally. 
The “universal law of right” is unitary because it cannot and does not 
address itself to unintentional material wrongs.  To command a person not to do 
something is just to command her not to act on certain maxims, and 
unintentional wrongs have irreproachable maxims.  The Universal Principle of 
Right, by contrast, articulates two standards because actions can be wrong in two 
ways, one of which does not depend on whether an agent undertakes to do wrong. 
If I am right about the foregoing, then Kant restates only the second prong 
of the Universal Principle of Right (A) in imperative form as the “universal law of 
right” (B).  I believe that a side-by-side textual comparison supports my 
philosophical argument: 
A)  Any action is right…if under its maxim the freedom of 
choice of each can coexist with the freedom of all in 
accordance with a universal law. 
B)  [S]o act externally that the free use of your choice can 
coexist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a 
universal law 
                                                   
207 For an alternative account of the distinction between the Universal Principle 
of Right and the “universal law of right,” see Katrin Flickschuh, “Reason, Right, 
and Revolution: Kant and Locke,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 36 (2008): 375-
404, p. 390.  (hereafter Reason, Right, and Revolution) 
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Each of the above clauses refers to the “freedom of choice” or the “free use of your 
choice” rather than to a choice or action, simpliciter.  I believe that Kant chose 
these words because, as I have argued, the test for formal wrongs focuses on 
whether the legality of a contemplated action—the freedom to choose to act in its 
maxim—would be consistent with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a 
universal law. 
One serious textual objection to my two-standard interpretation of the 
Universal Principle of Right remains: the principle as written appears to establish 
a disjunctive standard for the rightness of actions, when a conjunctive standard is 
required.  Gregor correctly converts the German oder into “or” in her popular 
translation: 
Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone’s freedom 
in accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the 
freedom of choice of each can coexist with everyone’s 
freedom in accordance with a universal law.208 
Given how I have interpreted its component parts, this principle appears to state 
that any action is right 1) if it is not a material wrong, “or” 2) if it is not a formal 
wrong.  This cannot be Kant’s literal meaning, because no action can be both 
wrong and right.  A right action must meet both standards. 
Logicians have identified two distinct meanings of “or,” known as the 
“inclusive or” and the “exclusive or,” but neither one can rescue this sentence as a 
standard for the rightness of actions.  If this sentence employs the “inclusive or,” 
                                                   
208 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 24.  (Ak. 6:230) (emphasis added) 
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it states that any action is right if it meets either one of the two standards.209  A 
“right action,” on this interpretation, also may—but does not need to—meet both 
standards.  The “exclusive or” interpretation also fails to yield the required 
meaning.  Indeed, it is a less plausible choice than the “inclusive or,” because the 
“exclusive or” presupposes that any action which meets one of the two disjunctive 
standards must fail the other.210  In other words, on the “exclusive or” 
interpretation, the principle wrongly assumes that any action which is not a 
material wrong must be a formal wrong and vice-versa, and states that any action 
which is wrong in only one way is right—a pair of claims that incoherently imply 
that all actions are both wrong and right. 
One of two things must, therefore, be true: either my central claim about 
the meaning of the Universal Principle of Right—that it articulates two distinct 
standards for the rightness of actions, corresponding to the two different ways, 
formal and material, in which actions can be wrong—is incorrect, or the German 
word oder in this sentence is a typo.  This chapter’s philosophical argument in 
favor of a two-standard reading weighs in favor of the latter possibility.  The 
original edition of the Doctrine of Right, in which the Universal Principle of Right 
appears, was not carefully vetted for errors.  Indeed, many scholars believe that it 
presents several of Kant’s arguments in the wrong order.211  Moreover, Kant 
reportedly refused to help publishers who edited this work for a subsequent 
                                                   
209 See Alan Hausman, et al., Logic and Philosophy: A Modern Introduction, 
12th Edition (Wadsworth: Boston, 2013), pp. 30-2. 
210 Ibid. 
211 See Metaphysics of Morals, pp. xxxii-iv. (translator’s note on the text) 
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edition because he was too consumed by other projects.212  The typo that I claim 
to have identified is certainly not obvious, given the opacity of the Universal 
Principle of Right and the controversy surrounding its meaning.  It could easily 
have escaped notice.  But if I am right, then its correction—from oder to und—is 
very illuminating. 
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Chapter 3:  The Limits of the Law 
In The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant writes that the legislative authority 
“cannot do anyone wrong by its law.”213  Some theorists overlook this ambiguous 
passage in favor of a Kantian theory that accommodates the existence of “unjust 
laws”—enactments that wrong the people but obligate them to obey nonetheless.  
In this chapter, I will argue for an alternative view.  I believe Kant meant to say, 
in the passage quoted above, that any statute that logically contradicts the 
concept of a rightful condition—and therefore wrongs the people—is no law at all.  
If my interpretation of Kant’s argument in this passage is correct, it has a 
surprising implication:  an action can only be criminalized if it is independently 
formally wrong. 
Advocates for a positivist interpretation of Kant’s legal philosophy cite his 
passionate injunctions against resistance, insurrection, and revolution as proof 
that Kant cannot have been a natural law theorist.  However, such objections fail 
to distinguish between a negative duty to refrain from resisting the state’s 
executive authority and an affirmative duty to obey the nominal commands of 
unjust enactments.  Moreover, I will show that Kant’s unconditional commitment 
to every rational being’s duty of logical consistency precludes a positivist theory 
of law. 
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Possible Lawgiving 
Kant maintained that all juridical law is a product of the omnilateral will, 
and therefore cannot be unjust.214  He writes: 
The legislative authority can belong only to the united will of 
the people.  For since all right is to proceed from it, it cannot 
do anyone wrong by its law.215   
At least two very different interpretations of this passage are textually plausible.  
On what I will call the “procedural interpretation,” Kant would be claiming that 
all laws are just (i.e. in accordance with principles of right) if they are enacted in a 
procedurally adequate way by the sovereign (i.e. the legislative body).  The 
procedural interpretation takes the words “legislative authority” to refer 
concretely to the sovereign of an existing government, and the word “law” to refer 
to any of the sovereign’s procedurally adequate enactments.  On this reading, all 
properly enacted statutes are laws, and they are also just, because the sovereign is 
empowered to make laws on behalf of the people, who cannot wrong themselves. 
The procedural interpretation must be wrong, because Kant’s conception 
of “right” is not merely procedural.  At the very beginning of the Doctrine of 
Right, Kant states, “The sum of those laws for which an external lawgiving is 
possible is called the doctrine of right.”216  Therefore, not every conceivable 
statute is a possible law.  Shortly thereafter, he describes the doctrine of right in 
terms of three ways in which it limits the subject matter of the law: 
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The concept of right, insofar as it is related to a moral 
obligation corresponding to it (i.e., the moral concept of 
right), has to do, first, only with the external and indeed 
practical relation of one person to another, insofar as their 
actions, as deeds, can have (direct or indirect) influence on 
each other.  But, second, it does not signify the relation of 
one’s choice to the mere wish (hence also to the mere need) 
of the other, as in actions of beneficence or callousness, but 
only a relation to the other’s choice.  Third, in this reciprocal 
relation of choice no account at all is taken of the matter of 
choice, that is, of the end each has in mind with the object he 
wants; it is not asked, for example, whether someone who 
buys goods from me for his own commercial use will gain by 
the transaction or not.  All that is in question is the form in 
the relation of choice on the part of both, insofar as choice is 
regarded merely as free, and whether the action of one can 
be united with the freedom of the other in accordance with a 
universal law.217 
At least some conceivable statutes—such as those prohibiting purely personal 
beliefs and activities or consensual relationships—would appear to fall outside of 
this purview.  
I believe, therefore, that Kant’s claim that the legislative authority “cannot 
do anyone wrong by its law” requires a different interpretation if it is not to be 
discarded as meaningless.  On my alternative reading, the words “legislative 
authority” in Kant’s statement refer to the sovereign’s lawmaking authority rather 
than to the sovereign itself.  So understood, Kant’s claim is that all laws must be 
rightful because they are the product of that authority—a claim that implies that 
statutes only have the status of laws insofar as they are rightful.  For example, 
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Kant argued that a sovereign lacks the ability to delegate his legislative authority 
to another body: 
Whoever has [the legislative authority] can control the 
people only through the collective will of the people; he 
cannot control the collective will itself, which is the ultimate 
basis of any public contract.218 
I believe that Kant’s point in the above sentence can be generalized in this way:  
all laws are rightful because the subject-matter limitation that right imposes on 
lawmakers functions as a legal disability.  When lawmakers enact unjust statutes, 
they simply fail to exercise their authority. 
   This legislative disability is analogous to our duty of “rightful honor” on 
an individual level. 219  Recall that private contracts to sell our selves into slavery 
or indentured servitude have no legal effect because they contain terms to which 
no free agent could rationally consent, thus violating our duty of rightful 
honor.220  I can try to make such a contract—I can utter the words or sign the 
document that expresses my intention—but the result is a legal nullity.  I believe 
that unjust statutes are legal nullities in exactly the same way, and for exactly the 
same reason.  Kant’s standard for the justice of statutes is one of possible 
consent: 
“The touchstone of anything that can serve as a law over a 
people lies in the question: whether a people could impose 
such a law on itself.”221 
                                                   
218 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 113.  (Ak. 6:342) 
219 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 29.  (Ak. 6:236) 
220 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 104.  (Ak. 6:330) 
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A statute to which we cannot possibly consent is just like a private contract to 
which we cannot possibly consent: both violate our duty of rightful honor.  
Neither public nor private violations of this kind can legally bind us, because they 
logically contradict the concept of a rightful condition. 
Recall that the state’s three authorities—legislative, executive, and 
judicial—must be exercised separately because they authorize metaphysically 
distinct activities.  Legislation is purely conceptual, judgment is the application of 
concepts to physical objects, and the exercise of executive authority is physical 
coercion in accordance with law.222  I believe that the reason lawmakers cannot 
“wrong the people” by passing statutes that contradict the concept of a rightful 
condition is because lawmaking is a conceptual activity.223  A logical 
contradiction simply negates itself.  Therefore, a logical contradiction between a 
statute and the concept of a rightful condition makes it the case that the statute in 
question simply does not exist as a law. 
This is a controversial Kantian view.  Many Kantian views do not take 
seriously Kant’s claim that “[t]he legislative authority…cannot do anyone wrong 
by its law.”  Disregarding this sentence enables some Kantians to conclude that 
statutes that are not rightful are “unjust laws,” which may wrong us, but which 
nonetheless have the capacity to obligate us.224  Unfortunately, Kant uses the 
word “law” in more than one way.  Sometimes, he uses the word merely to refer 
to “what is laid down as right, that is, what the laws at a certain place and at a 
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certain time say or have said.”225  Used in this way, “law” can describe unjust 
statutes.  For example, Kant writes, “If a public law is so composed that an entire 
people could not possibly give its assent to it (as, for example, in the case of a 
certain class of subjects having the hereditary privilege of a ruling rank), then it is 
unjust.”226 
Much more often, however, Kant uses the word “law” to refer to statutes 
that have the capacity to obligate us by “represent[ing] an action that is to be 
done as objectively necessary.”227  When Kant uses the word “law” in this 
narrower sense, his remarks suggest that unjust statutes are not laws at all.  For 
example, Kant declares, “The touchstone of anything that can serve as a law over 
a people lies in the question: whether a people could impose such a law on 
itself.”228  Specifically, an unjust enactment restricting religious belief “is quite 
simply null and void, even if it were to be confirmed by the most supreme 
authority, by means of parliaments or by the most ceremonious of peace 
treaties.”229  Such linguistic inconsistencies cannot be explained by the different 
subject matter of the enactments in question, for they fail the same formal test 
that Kant establishes for rightfulness: that the people could possibly consent to 
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them.230  Rather, Kant must be writing colloquially in some instances and more 
technically in others. 
I believe that it is important to use the word “law” to refer only to just 
legislation in the context of Kant’s political philosophy, because only just 
legislation has the capacity to obligate us.  The symmetry that Kant’s philosophy 
establishes between the moral law, which is internal, and the juridical law, which 
is external, depends on the normativity of both.231  Kant writes that the difference 
between moral and juridical laws (when the latter are obligatory laws rather than 
permissive laws232) is merely the nature of the incentive to obey the law’s 
command.  Because the moral law obligates us to adopt the categorical 
imperative as a principle of action, and because no one can coerce another to 
adopt any principle of action, the moral law’s incentive to obey must be internal: 
respect for the law.233  By contrast, a juridical law can only obligate us by 
                                                   
230 “[W]hat the whole people cannot decide for itself the legislator also cannot 
decide for the people.”  Metaphysics of Morals, p. 102.  (Ak. 6:327)  “What a 
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the collective will of the people.”  What is Enlightenment, p. 21.  (Ak. 8:40) 
231 A law “makes the actions [commanded] a duty.”  Metaphysics of Morals, p. 
20.  (Ak. 6:218) 
232 See, infra, pp. 106-7.  (discussing the distinction between obligatory laws and 
permissive laws) 
233 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 21.  (Ak. 6:220) 
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establishing an external incentive to obey in the form of coercive law 
enforcement.234 
In the sections that follow, I argue that Kant’s claim that no law can wrong 
the people should be taken seriously, and that my interpretation of his words is 
correct.  In order to avoid compounding the confusion generated by Kant’s 
occasional ambiguous use of the word “law,” I shall use that word to refer only to 
just legislation.  I shall call unjust provisions “statutes,” or “enactments.”  
Statutes that logically contradict the concept of a rightful condition cannot have 
legal authority—that is, they cannot obligate us—because the concept of a rightful 
condition is the justification for the state’s legislative authority.  We are obligated 
to obey the law because it is just, and only insofar as a statutory enactment is just 
is it a law. 
Authorization and Formal Defects 
With respect to questions of judgment—the application of the principles of 
right to particular circumstances in the world—subjects are rationally required to 
regard the state’s answer to disputed questions as their own answer, reached by 
the omnilateral will.  The government resolves many such questions at the level 
of policy as well as at the level of individual rights, from whether some particular 
war must be fought in order to defend the nation’s borders to whether state 
support for sick might be more efficiently disbursed as cash than by maintaining 
a public hospital.235  Even lawmakers’ illicit private purposes cannot deprive such 
                                                   
234 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 24-5.  (Ak. 6:231) 
235 Theory and Practice, p. 51.  (Ak. 8:297)  (The question of whether some 
particular war is necessary is a matter of judgment.)  See also Metaphysics of 
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statutes of lawful authority.236  Statutes that lawmakers have enacted in order to 
advance an improper purpose—like catering to the happiness of the population in 
order to secure reelection—may nonetheless be laws in light of any public 
purpose they might advance.237  For example, a content population could be 
instrumentally necessary to the preservation of the state, because content people 
are less likely to revolt.238   
However, Kant did not believe that subjects were rationally required to 
regard their government’s logical errors as authoritative.  If a legislature passes a 
statute that logically contradicts the concept of a rightful condition—the idea by 
which subjects are obligated to recognize the authority of the state in the first 
place—then the subject cannot be rationally required to regard that statute as an 
exercise of state authority, since no one can be rationally required to 
simultaneously regard two contradictory ideas as correct.  For this reason, “every 
human being indeed has his inalienable rights, ones that he cannot surrender 
                                                   
Morals, p. 133.  (Ak. 6:367) (The state may conclude that it will be more efficient 
to close a public hospital in order to provide money to individual patients for care 
at a location they choose.) 
236 Indeed, Kant acknowledges that pubic lawmakers “have a lively interest 
positions for themselves and their families, in the army, the navy, and the civil 
service, that depend on the minister, and who are always ready to play into the 
government’s hands.”  Metaphysics of Morals, p. 96.  (Ak. 6:319-20) 
237 Theory and Practice, p. 52.  (Ak. 8:298) 
238 Ibid.  Mary Gregor explains, “While Kant holds that it is legitimate for the 
state to secure the well-being if its citizens to the extent necessary to make them 
content to remain with in it, such legislation is only in the nature of a means to an 
end.”  Laws of Freedom, p. 36. 
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even if he wanted to and with regard to which he has the authority to pass his 
own judgment.”239 
There are at least three ways in which legislation can be formally defective.  
First, a statute is formally defective if it contradicts the lex permissiva, 
abrogating our natural permissive right to acquire rights of property, contract, 
and status.  These principles of private right “do not need to be promulgated,” 
and indeed they were common law principles in Prussia for at least part of Kant’s 
lifetime.  Kant explains in the context of property law that these rights cannot be 
negated by statute: 
When people are under a civil condition, the statutory laws 
obtaining in this condition cannot infringe upon natural 
right, (i.e., that right which can be derived from a priori 
principles for a civil constitution); and so the rightful 
principle ‘whoever acts on a maxim by which it becomes 
impossible to have an object of choice as mine wrongs me,’ 
remain in force.  For a civil constitution is just the rightful 
condition, by which what belongs to each is only secured, but 
not actually settled and determined.240 
Accordingly, a statute that nominally prohibits some (or all) members of 
the population from acquiring property cannot be a law, because no person could 
consent to a law that made it impossible for her to own an object of choice.  
Indeed, Kant implies that such statutes lack the status of law when he says that 
public enforcement of such a statute “wrongs” a subject, who is thereby denied 
the right own property.  Unlike lawmakers, whose exercise of public authority is 
purely conceptual, executive branch officials have the ability to wrong the people 
                                                   
239 Theory and Practice, p. 57.  (Ak. 8:304) 
240 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 45.  (Ak. 6:256) 
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by physically coercing them without legal authority.241  If as Kant claims, the 
legislative authority “cannot do anyone wrong by its law,” and if enforcement of 
statutes that deny individuals access to rights of property, contract, and status 
thereby wrongs them, it follows that such statutes cannot be laws.242 
Second, statutes are formally defective if they violate the principle of 
equality under the law.  This is the case, Kant explains, because we cannot 
consent to be bound more than we can, in turn, bind others.243  For example, a 
war tax levied only against a disfavored group makes an impermissible 
distinction between citizens.244  A ruler who imposes a tax or draft on an unequal 
basis “proceeds contrary to law” because she “goes against the law of equality.”245  
The principle of equality also applies to political participation.  Kant did not see 
universal suffrage as a requirement of justice, but if some persons are allowed to 
vote, Kant believed that the principle of equality required that laws establishing 
the qualifications for voting be neutral to the limited extent that any adult man 
could in theory “work his way up” from non-voting to voting status.246   
 Finally, Kant identifies certain private activities that cannot be justly 
criminalized, notably free speech and the free exercise of religion, because such 
                                                   
241 Kant writes that it is possible for “the ruler,” meaning the executive branch, to 
“proceed contrary to law,” and that doing so amounts to an “injustice.”  
Metaphysics of Morals, p. 95.  (Ak. 6:319) 
242 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 91.  (Ak. 6:313) 
243 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 91.  (Ak. 6:314) 
244 Theory and Practice, p. 51.  (Ak. 8:297)  (footnote) 
245 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 95.  (Ak. 6:319) 
246 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 92.  (Ak. 6:315)  A more consistent Kantian analysis 
might conclude that the principle of equality requires the franchise to be 
extended on a gender-neutral basis. 
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laws “would be opposed to the humanity in their own persons, and so to the 
highest right of the people.”247  A constitutional provision that established a 
requirement of religious orthodoxy, for example, “is quite simply null and void, 
even if it were to be confirmed by the most supreme authority, by means of 
parliaments or by the most ceremonious of peace treaties.”248  I understand Kant 
to mean that such enactments are not laws, because they contradict the concept 
of a rightful condition and therefore our duty of rightful honor, which limits the 
exercise of state authority to the range of conditions to which we have the 
capacity to legally obligate ourselves. 
The range of criminal laws that Kant explicitly identifies as formally 
defective is narrow, and roughly tracks the protections afforded by the First 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  Kant sometimes argued for freedom of 
speech, press, and religion on the specific basis that these freedoms contribute to 
the improvement of the state and of the human condition, and it is possible that 
Kant himself perceived no more general basis or range of application for this 
substantive limitation on the state’s criminal lawmaking authority.  Nonetheless, 
I shall argue in the next section that Kant’s specific examples in fact represent an 
application of a more general limitation on the state’s power to criminalize 
                                                   
247 For example, “The supreme authority especially has no right to prohibit 
internal reform of churches, for what the whole people cannot decide upon for 
itself the legislator also cannot decide for the people.  But no people can decide 
never to make further progress in its insight (enlightenment) regarding 
beliefs…since this would be opposed to the humanity in their own persons and so 
to the highest right of the people.  So no supreme authority can decide this for the 
people.” Metaphysics of Morals, p. 102.  (Ak. 6:327) 
248 What is Enlightenment, p. 20.  (Ak. 8:89) 
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private conduct—one that Kant ought to have recognized whether or not he did 
so. 
The Limits of the Criminal Law 
I believe that a statute is formally defective—and therefore not law—if it 
purports to criminalize conduct that is not formally wrong.  In chapter 2, I argued 
in favor of a two-pronged interpretation of the Universal Principle of Right, 
according to which an action is a formal wrong just in case the legality of an 
action on its maxim logically contradicts the concept of everyone’s freedom in 
accordance with a universal law (i.e. the concept of a rightful condition).249  This 
test has no empirical component: it simply compares the concept of a legal action 
on some particular maxim to the concept of a rightful condition.  For this reason, 
formal wrongs need not contravene any statute in order to be wrong.  Indeed, 
formal wrongs are possible in the state of nature, as Kant explains: 
Given the intention to be and to remain in this state of 
externally lawless freedom, human beings do one another no 
wrong at all when they feud among themselves; for what 
holds for one holds for the other, as if by mutual consent.  
But in general they do wrong in the highest degree by willing 
to be and remaining in a condition that is not rightful, that is, 
in which no one is assured of what is his against violence.250 
Whether I am in the state of nature or in a rightful condition, if the legality of an 
action on my maxim is logically inconsistent with the concept of a rightful 
condition, then my action on that maxim is a formal wrong by the standard that I 
                                                   
249 See, supra, pp. 43-4. 
250 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 86.  (Ak. 6:307-8)  (Latin parenthetical omitted) 
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have argued is the correct one.251  Merely existing in the state of nature is not 
formally wrong, but “willing” (i.e. choosing) to remain in that condition is 
formally wrong. 
I believe that the status of any given action as a formal wrong is 
independent of legislation in this way even when the action involves a violation of 
acquired rights established by legislation.  Such crimes—theft or attempted theft, 
for example—are formally wrong in all circumstances.  Theft just happens to be 
impossible to commit in the state of nature, and attempted theft is impossible to 
commit in the state of nature by anyone who knows that they are in a state of 
nature.  Recall that the property of wrongness in a formal wrong is a property of 
the maxim on which the offender acts:  an action is a formal wrong just in case 
the concept of a legal action in accordance with her maxim logically contradicts 
the concept of a rightful condition.  Facts about legal ownership do not affect the 
results of this inquiry.  Rather, our subjective beliefs about legal ownership 
restrict the set of maxims on which we can act. 
For example, if I know that I am in the state of nature, I can’t act on the 
maxim, “I will steal from others in order to feed myself,” because the concept of 
stealing presupposes property, which presupposes a state.  If I know that I am in 
a state of nature, but I would prefer to be in a civil condition, my maxim might 
be, “I will eat whatever does not belong to another in order to feed myself.”  There 
is no logical incompatibility between the legality of an action in accordance with 
                                                   
251 I thus disagree with Jacob Weinrib’s assertion that there are “two basic types 
of formal wrongs.”  Juridical Significance, p. 150.  I believe that there is a single 
standard for formal wrongdoing, which is equally applicable in the state of nature 
and in a rightful condition. 
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my maxim and the concept of a rightful condition.  This maxim is therefore 
unobjectionable in either environment.  It just so happens that, in the state of 
nature, I can eat almost anything in accordance with this maxim, since there are 
no established property rights to violate. 
On the other hand, if I mistakenly believe that I am in a civil condition, I 
can commit a formal wrong by making it my maxim to steal even though property 
rights don’t actually exist.  This case—essentially a case of attempted theft—is like 
those of the nearsighted anarchist and the would-be spark plug thief from 
Chapter 2.252  In each case, the agent commits a formal wrong because she makes 
it her maxim to do something that is wrong.  The fact that none of these agents 
succeed in actually committing material wrongs does not change the formally 
wrong nature of their actions. 
Kant’s analysis in Supposed Right to Lie supports my claim that subjective 
beliefs—not external facts—are relevant to the question of whether my action is a 
formal wrong (and thus also supports my more fundamental claim that the 
wrong-making property of a formal wrong is a property of the action’s maxim).  
Kant advises a man who must decide whether to lie to a murderer who comes to 
his door to demand the location of his intended victim: 
[I]f you told a lie and said that the intended victim was not in 
the house, and he has actually (though unbeknownst to you) 
gone out, with the result that by so doing he has been met by 
the murderer and thus the deed has been perpetrated, then 
in this case you may be justly accused as having caused his 
death.253 
                                                   
252 See, supra, pp. 56-7. 
253 Supposed Right to Lie, p. 65.  (Ak. 427) 
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I do not offer this example in order to defend Kant’s implausible conclusion that 
lying is always a formal wrong.254  Rather, I offer it to show how he reaches his 
conclusion.  Kant reveals that he considers the wrong-making property of the 
statement in question to be a property of the speaker’s maxim—“I will lie to a 
murderer in order to save a friend’s life”—rather than a property of the utterance 
itself.  In the above version of Kant’s hypothetical, the utterance itself was true, 
because the speaker’s friend had, in fact, secretly left the house.  Nonetheless, 
Kant concludes that the would-be deceiver is responsible for the consequences of 
his statement, because a feature of the speaker’s maxim—his subjective principle 
of action—made it the case that his action was a formal wrong. 
I have argued that formal wrongs have their status as wrongs regardless of 
whether or not they are prohibited by any legislative enactment, because the 
wrong-making property of a formally wrong action is a feature of the agent’s 
maxim and therefore does not depend on external facts about the world.  If I am 
correct, it follows that the converse proposition is also true:  legislation cannot 
make it the case that some previously rightful action becomes a formal wrong.  A 
statute that criminalizes the playing of contract bridge, for example, doesn’t cause 
contract bridge-playing to become formally wrong, because whether or not 
contract bridge-playing happens to violate the terms of a statute is not directly 
relevant to the question of whether the concept of a legal action on some 
particular contract bridge-player’s maxim logically contradicts the concept of a 
rightful condition. 
                                                   
254 I suspect that I disagree with Kant about the status of lies, but the analysis 
necessary to convert this suspicion (or its opposite) into a belief is beyond the 
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Recall that Kantian rights are reflexive: I have a right to do anything that is 
not wrong.255  It follows that coercion is only authorized (i.e. just) insofar as it 
hinders a wrong action.256  In Chapter 2, I described the two distinct ways in 
which an action may be wrong—material and formal—which together exhaust the 
possibility space for wrong actions.257  The state is authorized to hinder material 
wrongs by means of civil remedies, which bear a relation of “real opposition” to 
the material harm done.  The state is also authorized hinder formal wrongs by 
means of punishments determined by maxims that bear a relation of logical 
opposition to the maxim of a criminal act.  Conversely, state coercion is 
unauthorized, and therefore unlawful, unless it is hindering a wrong action in one 
of these two ways.  If my action is right, Kant argues, then “whoever hinders me 
in it does me wrong; for this hindrance (resistance) cannot coexist with freedom 
in accordance with a universal law.”258   
                                                   
scope of this particular project. 
255 See, supra, p. 7. 
256 Kant never claims that all wrong actions are coercive.  A wrong is not 
necessarily a “first use” of coercion.  A wrong action, defined as a “hinderance to 
freedom” may “hinder freedom” without coercing anyone, in which case it is a 
“formal wrong.”  But coercion is always a “hinderance to freedom” unless it is in 
response to a wrong action, in which case it is hindering a hindrance to freedom. 
257 Formal wrongs and material wrongs together exhaust the possibility space for 
wrong actions because “formal” and “material” are logical opposites.  Kant 
explains that two concepts are logical opposites “insofar as the sphere of one 
judgment excludes that of the other, yet at the same time [they have] the relation 
of community, insofar as the judgments together exhaust the sphere of cognition 
proper.”  Critique of Pure Reason, p. 208.  (A73/B99)  Ripstein appears to argue 
that Kantian principles can be used to establish a third wrong-making property of 
actions: free riding.  See Force and Freedom, pp. 256-261.  I argue for an 
alternative interpretation of statutes regulating access to public resources in 
chapter 4. 
258 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 24.  (Ak. 6:230-1) 
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Kant’s philosophical commitments about the nature of right and the 
nature of formal wrongdoing thus establish a natural law theory of crimes:  
criminal penalties are authorized by the principles of right only insofar as they 
punish actions that are independently formally wrong.  My philosophical 
argument for this point is consistent with a textual analysis of Kant’s discussions 
of criminal wrongdoing and punishment.  In his discussion of public right, Kant 
identifies a “right to punish” those who commit crimes rather than a right to 
make conduct criminal.259  For example, he writes, “The right to punish is the 
right a ruler has against a subject to inflict pain on him because of his having 
committed a crime.”260   
Moreover, Kant appears to understand a “penal law” to be legislation that 
authorizes the punishment of a crime rather than legislation that creates a crime.  
For example, Kant writes:  “I subject myself together with everyone else to the 
laws, which will naturally also be penal laws if there are any criminals among the 
people.”261  Kant also hints that the state’s inability to legislate against certain 
types of criminal conduct doesn’t make it the case that the conduct in question is 
not a crime when he writes, “There are…two crimes deserving of death, with 
regard to which it still remains doubtful whether legislation is also authorized to 
impose the death penalty.”262   In chapter 4, I will suggest that crimes can be 
punished only in cases in which the penal law provided a criminal with a certain 
                                                   
259 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 102.  (Ak. 6:327)  (italics omitted) 
260 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 104.  (Ak. 6:331) 
261 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 108.  (Ak. 6:335) 
262 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 108.  (Ak. 6:335) 
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kind of incentive to obey, which the criminal disregarded.  For the remainder of 
this chapter, I will focus on the question of which actions are “public crimes”—
formal wrongs—in the first place.263 
The application of my proposed standard for formal wrongdoing to actual 
statutes will be a complex challenge, a comprehensive exposition of which is 
beyond the scope of my current project.  Questions of judgment—the application 
of legal standards to specific actions in the world—are questions that the state’s 
judicial authority allows it to resolve conclusively.  For example, if a jury finds 
that a defendant intentionally engaged in a particular course of conduct, and 
court rules that that course of conduct meets the legal standard of reckless 
endangerment, it follows that the conduct in question may be justly punished.  
Therefore, I believe that a criminal statute is formally defective only if it 
establishes or relies upon a formally defective standard for rightful conduct, such 
that even appropriate deference to a court’s exercise of judgment with respect to 
its application of that standard cannot make it the case that the conduct 
prohibited is formally wrong.   
It seems likely to me that at least some strict liability criminal statutes are 
formally defective for this reason.  Compare the rationales of two hypothetical 
strict liability criminal statutes: 1) a statute that makes it a criminal misdemeanor 
to drive more than 20 miles per hour over the posted speed limit on public roads, 
and 2) a statute that makes it a criminal misdemeanor to possess  “burglar’s 
tools.”  The former statute might, in the judgment of a court, apply exclusively to 
a category of conduct that intentionally unreasonably endangers others, thus 
                                                   
263 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 105.  (Ak. 6:331) 
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constituting reckless endangerment.  The conduct of driving so much faster than 
the speed limit may be, as a matter of law, adequate evidence of an intention to 
drive very fast.  A speeder’s maxim might be, “I will drive very fast in order to get 
to work on time.”  Whether the speed at which the driver understood himself to 
be driving posed an unreasonable danger to others as a matter of law is a 
question of judgment, which the state is authorized to resolve.  Insofar as all of 
the conduct prohibited by a statute such as this one can be judged to be reckless 
endangerment, it is formally wrong conduct, and the statute is a just criminal 
law. 
By contrast, a strict liability statute that makes it a criminal misdemeanor 
to possess burglar’s tools would be an example of a “proxy crime”—a category of 
“offenses that are not blameworthy in themselves, but that stand in for more 
culpable activities.”264   Unlike the speeding statute, this strict liability statute 
doesn’t reflect a state’s exercise of judgment by marking off some degree of 
intentional danger to others on a continuum between rightful and wrongfully 
reckless conduct.  Instead, statutes that create “proxy crimes” prohibit wholly 
non-dangerous conduct by some in order to simplify the process of preventing 
criminal misbehavior by others.265 
                                                   
264 Zachary Price, “The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure,” Fordham Law 
Review 72 (2004): 885-941, p. 912. 
265 Jeannie Suk offers an excellent argument for the proposition that the issuance 
of a criminal protection order in the context of a domestic violence allegation 
amounts to the creation of a proxy crime with this kind of rationale.  See Jeannie 
Suk, “Criminal Law Comes Home,” The Yale Law Journal 116 (2006): 2-70, pp. 
17-20. 
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If I am a handywoman, I may find the prohibited collection of tools 
professionally useful.  My maxim might be:  “I will possess burglar’s tools in 
order to repair my client’s refrigerators.”  Nothing in this maxim reflects 
knowledge of facts about my conduct that make it the case that my conduct 
endangers others or the state.  The rationale for the creation of a proxy crime is 
that imposing criminal penalties on blameless conduct will make wrongful 
conduct, such as the commission of burglaries, more difficult and risky for those 
who might be inclined to commit criminal acts.  One might argue, therefore, that 
the concept of a legal action on my maxim contradicts the concept of a rightful 
condition because the state will, as an empirical matter, find it impossible to 
prevent all burglaries if the possession of burglar’s tools is legal.  Effectively, the 
argument must be that my legal possession of burglar’s tools endangers others by 
causing a subset of the population to commit burglaries that they would 
otherwise forego. 
I believe that such a rationale cannot be accorded deference as the state’s 
legitimate exercise of judgment, because it depends on a conception of persons 
that is logically incompatible with the conception of persons as free rational 
beings that undergirds Kant’s entire normative philosophy.  It is our capacity to 
set our own purposes in accordance with the moral law that makes our external 
freedom a categorical imperative for us.266  Because the state is justified on the 
basis our status as free agents, its laws must be formally consistent with that 
status.  The free choice of another person (or even the free choice of my future 
self) to commit a crime such as burglary thus breaks the inferential chain 
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between my intrinsically harmless conduct—possessing burglar’s tools for the 
innocent purpose of fixing refrigerators—and any subsequent crimes 
committed.267 
We can now see that Kant’s famous examples of formally defective 
criminal statutes—those which prohibit speech or religious observation—are 
“proxy crimes” also, because they are formally defective according to the same 
analysis that I have just applied to a hypothetical statute criminalizing the 
possession of burglar’s tools.  The only argument for the proposition that speech 
or religious observance endangers the state or others involves a claim that these 
intrinsically harmless acts “cause” others (or our future selves) to subsequently 
commit crimes.  Because a criminal act is, by definition, the choice of a free agent, 
I believe that the law cannot presuppose such a causal relationship in order to 
justify restricting our lawful freedom.  I intend to take up the complex question of 
how my formulation of Kant’s standard for formal wrongs should be applied at 
greater length in a subsequent project. 
While a formally defective statute cannot create an obligation to obey its 
terms, it does not follow that those who disregard such statutes can lawfully resist 
their coercive enforcement.  As the case of the nearsighted anarchist in Chapter 2 
illustrated, it is formally wrong to resist the state’s executive authority even if 
state officials are exercising that authority unlawfully, and therefore 
despotically.268  In the next section, I will explain how this apparent 
                                                   
266 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 95.  (Ak. 6:318) 
267 I am grateful to Charles Fried for a helpful conversation about this subject. 
268 See, supra, pp. 54-7. 
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inconsistency can be resolved by distinguishing between physical resistance to 
state executive branch officials and mere passive disobedience of the nominal 
commands of unjust statutes.  I believe that this account can also assuage the 
concerns of proponents of a “legal positivist” reading of Kant by showing that a 
natural law theory can provide adequate philosophical resources to explain 
Kant’s unconditional opposition to active resistance against a legitimate state. 
The “Highest Legislation” 
So far, I have described what I take to be the limits of the sovereign’s 
legislative authority.  I have argued that we must always obey the law, but also 
that no formally defective (i.e. unjust) statute is a law.  This may seem like too 
deflationary an account of the law to qualify as Kantian.  After all, Kant is famous 
for his passionate injunctions against “resisting” the officials of any minimally 
adequate government, even if they are perpetrating deep injustices.  Jeremy 
Waldron, for example, argues that Kant must have been a legal positivist, because 
Kant’s justification for the state’s authority to resolve questions of judgment 
concerning the application of legal norms in the physical world also proves that 
even formally defective statutes must obligate us as laws.269 
I believe that arguments like these fail to attend adequately to the nuances 
of Kant’s idea of the original contract, which carefully distinguishes between the 
state’s legislative, executive, and judicial authorities.  Waldron, for example, 
assumes that unless an unjust enactment obligates us as a law, subjects would 
                                                   
269 See Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), p. 49. 
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have a right to physically resist executive officials who attempt to enforce it.270  
Kant’s confusing remarks on the subjects of “obedience” and “resistance” can be 
better understood—and reconciled—by attending to the fact that each authority is 
supreme in its own distinct sphere:  the law must always be obeyed, a court’s 
judgment in a particular case is final, and state executive branch officials must 
never be resisted.271 
I have argued that the nominal commands of formally defective statutes 
need not be obeyed because they simply are not laws.  However, just because the 
body that holds the legislative authority—the sovereign—fails to exercise that 
authority on some particular occasion does not mean that it no longer holds the 
exclusive authority to legislate on behalf of the people.  Revolution—understood 
as the overthrow of the sovereign—therefore remains wrong.  Moreover, state 
executive branch officials cannot legally be physically resisted even when they act 
despotically, because the executive authority just is the state’s supreme coercive 
power.  Kant writes: 
[A]ll revolt that leads into rebellion, is the highest and most 
punishable offense in the commonwealth because it destroys 
the latter’s very foundations. And this prohibition is 
unconditional, such that even if the legislative authority or 
its agent, the head of state [the executive authority], violates 
the original contract and thereby surrenders, in the 
perception of the subjects, the right to be legislator by 
authorizing the government to act thoroughly violently 
                                                   
270 The Dignity of Legislation, p. 56. 
271 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 93.  (Ak. 6:316) 
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(tyrannically), the subject is still not allowed to resist in any 
way.272    
Because the state’s three authorities are constitutive of our external 
freedom, we are rationally required to conceive of the existing government as 
holding those authorities so long as it maintains “a condition in which what 
belongs to each can be secured against everyone else.”273    A government need 
not do this task perfectly in order to be legitimate.  A comprehensive 
determination of necessary and sufficient conditions for state legitimacy is 
beyond the scope of this project, which explores questions of legal obligation in 
the context of a presumptively legitimate state.  It is clear, though, that Kant 
himself thought the bar that a state must clear in order to be legitimate was very 
low, and certainly consistent with a great deal of abuse and injustice perpetrated 
by government.  This fact is clearly demonstrated by Kant’s anti-revolution 
writing. 
Most governments, then, are legitimate states in the sense that they must 
be regarded as holding the three authorities identified by Kant as the idea of the 
original contract.  Moreover, a state is the only means by which “the people” of 
any given state can be regarded as a totality at all.  It follows that individuals who 
attempt to overthrow the sovereign cannot possibly represent “the people,” 
because they are attempting to destroy the only institution through which “the 
people” can act.  Kant explains: 
[S]ince a people must be regarded as already united under a 
general legislative will in order to judge with rightful force 
                                                   
272 Theory and Practice, p. 53.  (Ak. 8:299) 
273 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 29.  (Ak. 6:237) 
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about the supreme authority (summum imperium), it cannot 
and may not judge otherwise than as the present head of 
state (summus imperans) wills it to.274   
Because groups of revolutionaries cannot act on behalf of “the people,” Kant 
argues, they are merely “mobs”—groups of individuals who lack the coercive 
authority that belongs only to the people, considered as a totality.275 
Some of Kant’s remarks on this subject appear ambiguous when taken out 
of context: does he mean to argue for a blanket duty of obedience to statutes, or is 
he merely condemning revolutionary activities?  In such cases, the surrounding 
discussion usually makes it clear that he is, again, condemning attempts to 
overthrow the government.  For example, Kant writes that, “a people cannot offer 
any resistance to the legislative head of state which would be consistent with 
right, since a rightful condition is possible only by submission to its general 
legislative will.”276  Because he is speaking specifically of the state’s legislative 
authority, it is tempting to read this passage as a claim that all statutes must be 
obeyed as law.  However, Kant’s next sentence indicates that he is writing 
                                                   
274 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 95.  (Ak. 6:318)  The phrase “head of state” is 
ambiguous.  In some places, Kant refers to the sovereign legislature as the “head 
of state.”  Metaphysics of Morals, p. 94.  (Ak. 6:317)  In others, he uses the phrase 
“head of state” to refer to the three authorities of the state—legislative, executive, 
and judicial—considered as a unified whole. Metaphysics of Morals, p. 111.  (Ak. 
6:338)  By “supreme authority,” Kant seems to refer to the entire, unified state, so 
it is perhaps more likely in context that he assigned the same meaning to the 
words “head of state” here in order to avoid repetition. 
275 Theory and Practice, p. 55.  (Ak. 8:302) 
276 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 96.  (Ak. 6:320) 
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specifically in opposition to any attempted overthrow of the sovereign:  “There is, 
therefore, no right to sedition (seditio), still less to rebellion (rebellio).”277 
A few sentences later (during which he declares the assassination of a 
monarch, who holds the legislative authority, to be always unacceptable), Kant 
describes the duty not to resist the “highest legislation.”  I understand him to be 
referring to the idea of the original contract: 
The reason a people has a duty to put up with even what is 
held to be an unbearable abuse of supreme authority is that 
its resistance to the highest legislation can never be regarded 
as other than contrary to law, and indeed as abolishing the 
entire legal constitution.278   
Under the idea of the original contract, only the sovereign (i.e. the legislator) can 
make law, and only the ruler (i.e. the executive) can engage in rightful coercion.  
It follows that the people do wrong if they overthrow the sovereign or coerce 
executive branch officials.279   
So understood, nothing in Kant’s remarks indicates that the nominal 
commands contained in formally defective statutes must be obeyed as though 
they are law, and I do not know how an obligation specified in just that way could 
be consistent with the concept of a rightful condition.    For example, suppose 
that a formally defective statute required subjects to report their neighbors for 
engaging in prohibited religious practices.  To obey the statute would involve 
                                                   
277 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 96.  (Ak. 6:320) 
278 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 97.  (Ak. 6:320) 
279 Kant summarizes, “this way of seeking one’s right [revolution] (taken as one’s 
maxim) makes all lawful constitutions uncertain and leads into a state of 
complete lawlessness (status naturalis), where all right ceases, or at least ceases 
to be effective. Theory and Practice, p. 55.  (Ak. 8:301) 
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reporting your neighbors for committing no wrong.  By contrast, to forego 
resistance to the state’s executive authority would involve allowing yourself to be 
taken into custody if the police come to arrest you for failure to report your 
neighbors.  Not only does active obedience to the nominal command of the 
defective statute not seem obligatory, it seems as though we might be obligated to 
disobey such a statute.  Kant wrote that subjects must “[o]bey the authority that 
has power over you (in whatever does not conflict with inner morality).”280  
Because moral duties are unconditional, it follows that we are morally obligated 
not to obey statutes that nominally command us to do wrong. 
The lawmaking authority of a Kantian state is vested exclusively with the 
sovereign, but depending on what statutes they pass, I believe that lawmakers 
may or may not succeed in actually exercising this authority.  Kant’s political 
philosophy does not provide the resources necessary to establish a general 
obligation to obey the propositions contained in statutes.  Rather, we are 
obligated to obey the law.  We are also morally obligated not to commit other 
formal wrongs, including resistance and revolution, whether or not the 
legislature has specifically prohibited them. 
                                                   
280 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 136.  (Ak. 6:371) 
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Chapter 4:  Acting Lawfully    
Imagine that you are running errands downtown, and you realize that the 
two-hour meter at which you have parked your car is about to expire.  Do you 
retrieve your car immediately, or do you complete your tasks?  More importantly 
for the argument that follows, on what basis do you make your choice?  Do you 
feel obligated to obey the terms of the ordinance that limits public parking to two 
hours, or do you simply estimate the likelihood and cost to you of receiving a 
parking ticket?  I believe that many, perhaps most, of us make decisions about 
parking violations on the basis of the likely costs and benefits, to us, of nominal 
compliance with the law.  I also believe, and hope to show, that in doing so we do 
no wrong, even from a Kantian perspective. 
Kant recognized two different kinds of juridical law:  “obligatory laws,”281 
which were the primary focus of Chapter 3, and “permissive laws.”282  Obligatory 
laws constrain our prospective choices as we set and pursue our private 
purposes.283  Collectively, they are the state’s answer to the question:  “What may 
I lawfully choose to do?”  This kind of law has two constitutive elements: 
universality and obligation.284  Because the juridical law “does not expect, much 
                                                   
281 “Obligatory laws for which there can be an external lawgiving are called 
external laws (leges externae) in general.”  Metaphysics of Morals, p. 17.  (Ak. 
6:224) 
282 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 16.  (Ak. 6:223) 
283 “A principle that makes certain actions duties is a practical law.”  Metaphysics 
of Morals, p. 17.  (Ak. 6:224) 
284 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 14.  (Ak. 6:220)  An obligatory law “represents an 
action that is to be done as objectively necessary.” Metaphysics of Morals, p. 20.  
(Ak. 6:218)  By “objectively necessary,” I take Kant to mean that an obligatory law 
must be universally necessary, meaning necessary for everyone. 
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less demand” that we obey the law merely out of respect for the law, any 
obligatory law must provide us with an “external incentive” to obey its 
commands.285  I believe, and will try to show, that this required external incentive 
must be one that every person is rationally required to respond to by obeying the 
law in the set of circumstances to which the law applies, and that this 
requirement is an application of the law’s more general requirement of 
universality. 
Permissive laws are not formally defective, or they could not be considered 
“laws” at all.  However, they can be distinguished from obligatory laws by the fact 
that they do not obligate us to do or refrain from doing anything.286  Instead, 
permissive laws empower us to change our legal rights and obligations 
voluntarily.  In other words, a permissive law “makes it possible for a merely 
permissible act, one that is neither forbidden nor required, to have consequences 
for rights.”287   
Some permissive laws give effect to the original lex permissiva—our 
natural permissive right to acquire rights of property, contract, and status—by 
establishing procedures that enable us to acquire such rights if we so choose.   For 
example, a statute that specifies how and where property deeds are recorded does 
not obligate me, because it does not tell me that I must acquire property, nor does 
it tell me (unless it is formally defective) that I cannot do so.  It simply specifies 
                                                   
285 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 21, 24-5.  (Ak. 6:219, 6:231) 
286 Kant writes, “An action that is neither commanded nor prohibited is merely 
permitted…The question can be raised whether there are such actions and, if 
there are, whether there must be permissive laws (lex permissiva) in addition to 
laws that command and prohibit.”  Metaphysics of Morals, p. 16.  (Ak. 6:223) 
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the means by which I can acquire a legal title to real property (along with a 
corresponding legal liability for property taxes).  Similarly, a statute that 
establishes a set of rights and obligations for marital partners does not require 
me to get married, nor (unless it is formally defective) does it prohibit me from 
marrying.  Rather, it specifies one way in which I can alter my legal rights and 
obligations if I so choose. 
All of our legal obligations are moral obligations as well,288 but 
determining exactly what the law requires or prohibits is no straightforward 
exercise.  In the coming pages, I will argue that only punishments involving 
physical coercion, such as incarceration or the death penalty, can provide a 
universal external incentive to comply with the terms of any statute.  Therefore, 
statutes that impose only fines for noncompliance are not obligatory laws, and 
non-compliance with the terms of such statutes is not “unlawful” in the Kantian 
sense of the word.  Instead, if such statutes are free of formal defects, I believe 
that they must be regarded as rightful permissive laws that impose taxes or fees 
on lawful conduct. 
Legal Obligation Requires a Universal External Incentive 
Like the Categorical Imperative, an “obligatory law” (by which I will 
always mean a juridical law that imposes an obligation on us) is a kind of 
“morally practical law” because it “asserts an obligation with respect to certain 
                                                   
287 Force and Freedom, p. 103.  (footnote) 
288 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 22.  (Ak. 6:220-221) 
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actions.”289  However, while the incentive to comply with moral commands can 
come only from within the deliberating agent,290 any obligatory law must provide 
an external incentive to obey its command.291  This is the case because, as Kant 
explains, an external law by definition “does not at all expect, far less demand, 
that I myself should limit my freedom.”292  An obligatory law’s external incentive 
must be “drawn from pathological determining grounds of choice, inclinations 
and aversions, and among these, from aversions, for it is a lawgiving, which 
constrains, not an allurement, which invites.”293   
I believe that there are two different reasons why an obligatory law’s 
external incentive must be an “aversion” rather than a reward or privilege.  First, 
as Kant observes above, it is inconsistent with the idea of obligation to reward 
people simply for obeying the law.  Second, no material benefit could serve as a 
universal incentive, and universality is a constitutive property of law.294  Whether 
or not I value money or accolades, for example, is a contingent empirical fact.  I 
am not rationally required to value them, and if I do not, then rewards in the 
form of money or accolades could not motivate me.  By contrast, every free agent 
is rationally required to value her freedom.  For this reason, I believe that the 
                                                   
289 A categorical imperative, because it asserts an obligation with respect to 
certain actions, is a morally practical law.”  Metaphysics of Morals, p. 15.  (Ak. 
6:223) 
290 See Groundwork, pp. 13-4.  (Ak. 4:400-1) 
291 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 20-1.  (Ak. 6:219) 
292 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 24-5.  (Ak. 6:231) 
293 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 20.  (Ak. 6:219) 
294 Universal law is the only kind of “law” there is, because universality is a 
constitutive property of law understood as an objective (i.e. universal) principle 
of action. 
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incentive that any juridical law must provide in order to obligate us universally 
must be the threatened loss of external freedom.  In other words, it must be 
coercive.295 
Kant writes that the concept of obligation, in the context of both moral and 
juridical law, “is the necessity of a free action under a categorical imperative of 
reason.”296  If, as Kant maintains, juridical law cannot expect us to obey merely 
out of a sense of respect for law,297 then I believe it follows that an obligatory 
law’s external incentive must make it the case that we are rationally required to 
obey the law’s command.  An incentive can only establish a rational requirement 
if it can motivate us regardless of any contingent preferences that we may have. 
Kant’s famous analysis of the so-called “right of necessity” illustrates this 
point, while at the same time demonstrating that a universal incentive (i.e. an 
incentive that will motivate everyone insofar as they are rational) is not 
necessarily also an unconditional incentive (i.e. an incentive that will motivate in 
all circumstances).  In highly unusual circumstances, the punishment authorized 
by a criminal law cannot provide a potential wrongdoer with an external 
incentive that she is rationally required to respond to by obeying the law.  In such 
                                                   
295 My inference is consistent with Kant’s claim that “one can locate the concept 
of right directly in the possibility of connecting universal reciprocal coercion with 
the freedom of everyone.”  Metaphysics of Morals, p. 25.  (Ak. 6:232) 
296 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 15.  (Ak. 6:222) 
297 Kant writes that “consciousness [of an obligation to obey] may not and cannot 
be appealed to as an incentive to determine [a subject’s] choice in accordance 
with this law.”  Metaphysics of Morals, p. 25.  (Ak. 6:232) 
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cases, even egregious wrongs cannot be punished by law,298 because “there is no 
law by which an authorization to use coercion can be determined.”299 
In Kant’s classic hypothetical, a shipwrecked sailor pushes an innocent 
man off a floating plank in order to save his own life, thereby drowning his 
victim.300  The homicidal sailor thus commits a formal wrong, because the 
concept of legal murder—even in extremis—logically contradicts the concept of 
everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law.  To see this, recall that 
law makes a rightful condition possible by making all of my possible choices 
consistent with all of your possible choices.301  The sailor therefore cannot have a 
legal right to act on the maxim, “I will kill you in order to save my own life,” 
because his action on that maxim would be hindered by his intended victim’s 
action on the same maxim.302  As I explained in Chapter 1, it is logically 
impossible for rights, as Kant conceives of them, to conflict in this way.303 
The logical impossibility of a legal right to commit murder demonstrates 
that murder is always wrong, but it does not entail that a sailor in these 
circumstances has a legal obligation not to commit murder.  Not all wrongful 
acts are unlawful—failing to leave the state of nature is wrong but not unlawful—
so we know that the impossibility of a legal right does not entail the presence of a 
                                                   
298 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 28.  (Ak. 6:236) 
299 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 27.  (Ak. 6:234)  (italics added) 
300 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 28.  (Ak. 6:235) 
301 See, supra, pp. 17-8. 
302 As Kant explains, “It is evident that were there such a right [to kill an innocent 
threat] the doctrine of right would have to be in contradiction with itself.”  
Metaphysics of Morals, p. 28.  (Ak. 6:235) 
303 See, supra, pp. 17-8. 
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legal obligation.  The following analysis will show that the shipwrecked sailor in 
Kant’s hypothetical has no legal right to kill his victim, but he also has no legal 
obligation not to do so (though he always has a moral obligation not to do 
wrong).  Effectively, the shipwrecked sailor and his victim are in a state of nature, 
understood as a situation in which the juridical law cannot govern our conduct.304 
Kant concludes that the state cannot punish the sailor, because the 
punishment that the law threatened for murder—the death penalty—failed to 
provide the sailor with an external incentive to obey the law under his unusual 
circumstances.305  Kant explains: 
A penal law of this sort could not have the effect intended, 
since a threat of an ill that is still uncertain (death by judicial 
verdict) cannot outweigh the fear of an ill that is certain 
(drowning).306 
I think Kant’s analysis here shows that he considers a universal incentive—one 
that will motivate every person to obey insofar as they are rational—essential to 
establish a legal obligation. 
As a matter of empirical fact, the anticipated public shame of a murder 
conviction might deter some people from committing murder even in the face of 
certain death.307  However, Kant does not consider an empirical psychological 
                                                   
304 Kant indicates that the sailor’s murder was wrongful but not unlawful in the 
sense of being opposed to the juridical law when he writes that “there is no law” 
by which the sailor’s punishment could be authorized.  Metaphysics of Morals, p. 
27.  (Ak. 6:234) 
305 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 28.  (Ak. 6:235) 
306 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 28.  (Ak. 6:235-6) 
307 I therefore disagree with Allen Rosen’s interpretation of Kant’s analysis of the 
shipwreck case.  Rosen writes, “The general principle…is that juridical laws 
should never attempt to regulate forms of external conduct that, in view of the 
  113 
incentive of this kind adequate to give the penal law the “effect intended.”  Nor 
did Kant discount the incentive of shame simply because, as a matter of empirical 
fact, the incentive of shame did not overcome this particular sailor’s fear of death.  
By that logic, no criminal would ever be punished, because all criminals by 
definition overcame the incentives provided by the punishments associated with 
the laws they broke. 
Rather, Kant’s analysis shows that an external incentive is adequate to give 
a penal law the “effect intended” just in case it is one that every human being is 
rationally required to respond to by obeying the law, regardless of his or her 
contingent preferences.  The threatened death penalty provides an incentive that 
every potential murderer is rationally required to avoid by obeying the law, 
except under circumstances in which death will result from obedience.  The law 
against murder therefore legally obligates us under all and only those 
circumstances in which it provides us with a rational requirement to do obey. 
More generally, I believe that the “effect intended” by the penal law as 
Kant conceives of it is to constrain our prospective conduct universally.  It follows 
that the law must punish if—and only if—the punishment that it threatened is one 
that the wrongdoer was rationally required to avoid by complying with the law.  A 
court would make the same mistake by punishing someone under circumstances 
in which he was not rationally required to obey the law as it would by failing to 
punish someone under circumstances in which he was rationally required to 
obey.  Both kinds of inconsistency would undermine the universal character of 
                                                   
contingent facts of human psychology, cannot effectively be controlled through 
the coercive apparatus available to legal systems.”  Kant’s Theory of Justice, p. 
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the law, which must constrain everyone’s choices to the same extent under the 
same circumstances. 
Understood in this way, the universality of obligatory law is exactly the 
same thing as our equality under it.  Recall that an external incentive to obey is 
essential to provide “assurance” that our rights will be secure.  “Assurance” 
makes our rights secure in a way that is independent of the mere “good will” of 
our neighbors, and is therefore essential to make the rights of the weak or mild 
subject equal to the rights of the strong or unscrupulous one.  A merely 
contingent incentive would give us unequal assurance by motivating those for 
whom the incentive is adequate while leaving those for whom the incentive is 
inadequate unrestrained.  A law must be universally capable of guiding our 
conduct in order to universally obligate us.  Because the law must obligate us 
equally in order to obligate us at all, I therefore believe that a merely contingent 
incentive cannot generate a legal obligation for anybody. 
Monetary Penalties Are Not Universal Incentives 
If I am correct that a law can only obligate us by means of an external 
incentive that is adequate to establish a rational requirement to obey, then the 
range of external incentives by which the state can legally obligate us is narrower 
than many people believe.  I previously argued that monetary rewards or 
accolades cannot be universal incentives, because no one is rationally required to 
value money or accolades over any competing desire.  Similarly, I believe that 
monetary penalties cannot be universal incentives, because no one is rationally 
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required to value the continued possession of a sum of money over any 
competing desire. 
As Kant observes, money has “no value in itself.”308  Rather, it “can be 
used only by being alienated.”309  There are no external circumstances under 
which we are rationally required to prioritize our continued possession of a sum 
of money over competing interests, save perhaps in the unusual circumstance 
that the sum of money in question is essential to our continued survival.310  This 
is the case because money is merely a means by which we can measure the 
tradeoffs that we make between our desires:  “a thing which, in the circulation of 
possessions, determines the price of all other things.”311 
Ripstein has observed that civil damages cannot universally motivate us to 
respect the rights of others, although he does not appear to share my view about 
the implications that his analysis has for our legal obligations.  He writes:   
The person who sets out to wrong another cannot merely be 
made to disgorge his gains or pay damages.  Such payment 
could in principle entitle the criminal to wrong his victim, as 
a matter of right, simply by paying the requisite fee.312 
                                                   
308 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 69.  (Ak. 6:286) 
309 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 69.  (Ak. 6:286) 
310 We may be rationally required to prioritize retaining some particular sum of 
money over a smaller and less certain sum of money.  However, there is no set of 
external circumstances under which that would be the only possible interest at 
stake.  For example, a person who enjoys the feeling that she is doing something 
illegal may break the law for the sheer fun of it.  Her preference may be open to 
moral criticism, but we cannot say that she is acting against her own rational self-
interest valuing the enjoyment she receives from breaking a law more than the 
money her actions will cost her. 
311 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 70.  (Ak. 6:288) 
312 In Extremis, p. 417. 
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To see what he means, suppose that a disgruntled employee considers 
adopting the maxim, “I will punch my boss for the sheer joy of it.”  Because the 
concept of a legal action on her maxim logically contradicts the concept of a 
rightful condition, the disgruntled employee is considering committing a formal 
wrong.  However, the threat of liability for civil damages may or may not provide 
this employee with an incentive to refrain from punching her boss, depending on 
just how disgruntled she is and how happy she thinks that punching her boss 
would make her.  Although it is certainly true that many people in her situation 
would in fact be deterred from committing assault by the prospect of an 
expensive judgment, no one would be rationally required to be so deterred.  If 
civil penalties alone do not deter this employee from her violent act, we may 
complain that she is acting immorally, but not that she is disregarding her own 
rational self-interest.313 
For this reason, Ripstein argues, individual rights can be reliably protected 
only by means of a threatened criminal punishment that “makes the wronging of 
the victim normatively unavailable, that is, it is something that the wrongdoer 
cannot rightfully acquire through his act.”314  The sense in which criminal 
punishments make wrongdoing “normatively unavailable” is that, unlike paying a 
sum of money, death or imprisonment are not conditions to which I can 
rationally consent in return for the satisfaction of any material desire.  In a 
different context, Kant observes: 
                                                   
313 As Christine Korsgaard explains, “Kant is not claiming that it is irrational to 
perform immoral actions because it actually embroils us in contradictions.” 
Groundwork, p. xxi.  (introduction) 
314 In Extremis, p. 417. 
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[E]verything has either a price or a dignity.  What has a price 
can be replaced by something else as its equivalent; what on 
the other hand is raised above all price and therefore admits 
of no equivalent has a dignity.315 
Although Kant was there speaking of moral law, the principle he articulates is 
applicable in the context of external freedom as well:  Our external freedom has a 
dignity, and it cannot rationally be traded for anything.  This principle is 
contained in the Kantian concept of rightful honor, which limits the kinds of 
legally binding bargains that I can make with others to those that preserve my 
physical freedom of action.  For example, if I try to sell myself into slavery, the 
result is a legal nullity, because this is not a bargain to which I, regarded as a 
rational being, have the ability to consent.316   
Rightful honor mediates the difference between civil damages, which I can 
rationally agree to pay, and a jail term, to which I cannot rationally commit 
myself.  Kant describes prison labor as such a condition: 
[N]o human being in a state can be without any dignity, since 
he at least has the dignity of a citizen.  The exception is 
someone who has lost it by his own crime, because of which, 
though he is kept alive, he is made a mere tool of another’s 
choice (either of the state or of another citizen)…No one can 
bond himself to this kind of dependence, by which he ceases 
to be a person, by contract, since it is only as a person that he 
can make a contract. 
We can now see that criminal punishments provide us with a universal external 
incentive to obey just in case they are conditions to which our duty of rightful 
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honor would make it impossible for us to bind ourselves.317  As Ripstein writes, 
“Kant cannot accept the idea that the criminal law is a series of offers, because 
these are not offers that anyone could rightfully make.”318  
Fines Establish Only Permissive Laws 
A monetary penalty cannot, in principle, be a universal incentive to obey 
any law, because no one is rationally required to value a sum of money over any 
competing material interest.  While Ripstein appears to see this merely as a 
reason why civil damages cannot reliably protect our rights, I believe that it has 
an additional implication: criminal penalties are the only way in which the state 
can legally obligate us.  A universal external obligation requires a universal 
external incentive. 
Criminal punishments are “pathological” in the sense that they constrain 
us physically, but it is their effect on our freedom that gives them their universal 
character.  A disgruntled employee may not actually value her freedom from jail 
more than the happiness she expects to receive by punching her boss, but the fact 
that she is rationally required to do so makes this incentive universal in the only 
way it possibly can be universal.  Obligatory laws must threaten criminal 
penalties because only physical restraint or harm will necessarily motivate 
everyone to obey under the same set of circumstances insofar as they are rational.  
                                                   
316 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 104.  (Ak. 6:330)  Kant would make an exception 
for domestic relationships, which he thought required special natural law 
authority because they limited freedom of movement.  See, supra, pp. 20-5. 
317 I am grateful to Daniel Viehoff for helpful comments on this subject. 
318 In Extremis, p. 419. 
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Insofar as the law obligates us to obey, this requirement of universality is really a 
requirement of equality under the law. 
One surprising implication of this analysis is that many familiar laws that 
we are accustomed to thinking of as obligatory, including many ordinary parking 
and traffic ordinances, do not actually constrain our lawful choices.  Indeed, in 
the context of a law against slander, Kant himself explains that a fine is not a 
universal incentive, and also that it does not bear an appropriate relation of 
logical inversion to the charged crime: 
A fine, for example, imposed for a verbal injury has no 
relation to the offense, for someone wealthy might indeed 
allow himself to indulge in a verbal insult on some occasion; 
yet the outrage he has done to someone’s love or honor can 
still be quite similar to the hurt done to his pride if he is 
constrained by judgment and right not only to apologize 
publicly to the one he has insulted but also to kiss his hand, 
for instance, even though he is of a lower class.319 
A wealthy would-be slanderer can thus be punished by a court order coercing him 
to perform humiliating actions, while a fine—because money has value only 
insofar as it determines the price of gratifying our desires—cannot serve this 
function.320 
Ripstein concedes that “Kant is wary of fines” as punishments for this 
reason.321  Nonetheless, Ripstein believes that fines can be punishments because 
that fact that money “is the general ‘means by which men exchange their 
                                                   
319 Metaphysics of Morals, p. 106.  (Ak. 6:332) 
320 Presumably, if the slanderer refused to comply with the court order, he could 
be imprisoned for contempt of court. 
321 Hindering a Hindrance to Freedom, n. 28. 
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industriousness’” makes it the case that money “can be treated as an 
approximation to a measure of freedom.”322  But of course Ripstein would deny 
that there is actually some rate of exchange between money and freedom.  
Indeed, the distinction between them is mediated by the duty of rightful honor, 
which permits us to alienate our future interest in material goods, but not to 
alienate our future physical freedom of action.323  This important distinction is 
reflected in the law of contract, which does not require specific performance of 
labor contracts, but instead authorizes only monetary damages for their 
breach.324 
I think Ripstein means to say that insofar as money is a perfectly general 
means of satisfying our material desires, we are rationally required to prefer 
more money to less money, all else equal.  This seems like an arguable but 
possibly correct claim.325  If it is correct, then it follows that a monetary penalty 
can serve as a “universal external incentive” only in a much less demanding sense 
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than I have claimed is required to establish a legal obligation.  On Ripstein’s view 
as I understand it, any threatened sanction that counts as a universal prima facie 
consideration against violating the terms of a statute is adequate to establish a 
legal obligation not to violate those terms, even if that prima facie consideration 
is easily outweighed by a rational assessment of the benefits obtainable by 
breaking the rule.  If Ripstein’s weaker notion of a universal external incentive 
were adequate to establish a legal obligation, then some subjects could profit, 
rather than being punished, for choosing to break the law.  The law would not 
have supremacy with respect to such subjects, but would instead be a mere 
means for them.  It is for this reason that I believe equality under the law requires 
more: an obligatory law must provide us with an external incentive that is 
universal in the stronger sense that every subject is thereby rationally required to 
obey the law.    In Kant’s words, a punishment must be sufficient to “determine [a 
subject’s] choice to act in accordance with [the] law,” rather than merely 
exercising an inconclusive influence on a subject’s choice.326 
  In a brief passage in Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant 
suggests that not all “sanctions” are punishments.  He writes, “sanctions are 
called ‘pragmatic’ that do not flow strictly from the right of states as necessary 
laws but from provision for the general welfare.”327  I believe that Kant 
characterizes welfare-enhancing “sanctions” as “pragmatic” in order to 
distinguish them from punishments associated with what he calls “necessary 
laws.”  I argued in Chapter 2 that formally wrong actions are wrong 
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independently of their prohibition by statute, and that the state must criminalize 
formally wrong actions in order to establish a rightful condition.328  I therefore 
understand Kant’s reference to “necessary laws” to refer to those laws that 
prohibit formal wrongs. 
By contrast, “pragmatic” means “belonging to welfare” rather than 
pertaining to rights.329  Pragmatic sanctions, therefore, are one means by which 
the state can protect itself by safeguarding the welfare of its subjects through 
activities such as pollution control, public health measures, and the regulation of 
conduct in public spaces.  Insofar as the many laws that further these ends 
impose only fines on those who violate their terms, I believe that such laws are 
permissive laws.  In Ripstein’s words, permissive laws enable “a merely 
permissible act, one that is neither forbidden nor required, to have consequences 
for rights.”330  Permissive laws that impose only fines cannot legally obligate us.  
Therefore, they do not constrain our lawful choices.  They nonetheless “have 
consequences for rights” by making it the case that we incur a monetary liability 
as a result of exercising a particular lawful choice.  In this way, fines function as 
taxes or fees on lawful conduct. 
Are Regulatory Violations Necessarily Material Wrongs? 
So far, I have shown that fines cannot establish a prospective legal 
obligation because they do not provide a universal incentive to obey a statute’s 
nominal commands under any set of external conditions.  For this reason, I have 
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argued that laws that impose only fines on nominal violators are not obligatory 
laws.  Instead, they are permissive laws that associate taxes or prices with some 
of our lawful choices.  I personally find this combination of conclusions 
intuitively satisfying, but I understand that others may feel that something has 
gone wrong here.  How can it not be wrong to disobey the terms of a rightful 
public statute?  In this section and the next, I will explore this objection by 
considering an example involving a common traffic ordinance and a very eager 
barber. 
John Edwards offers Barber Barbara $400 to give him a haircut, but only 
if she arrives at the airport in time to cut his hair before his private jet’s 
scheduled departure.  Barbara tells Edwards that she can arrive on time only if 
she travels alone in the highway’s carpool lane, violating the terms of the 
following statute: 
UNACCOMPANIED MOTORISTS ARE PROHIBITED 
FROM DRIVING IN DESIGNATED CARPOOL LANES.  
VIOLATORS WILL BE FINED $100. 
Edwards convinces Barbara to drive in the carpool lane by pointing out that the 
$100 fine that the law imposes is far less than the price of his haircut.  Moreover, 
because the law is enforced by cameras instead of police patrols, receiving a ticket 
would not delay her, and let us say for the sake of argument that the incident also 
would not affect Barbara’s auto insurance premiums.  Convinced, Barbara heads 
to the airport in the carpool lane and cuts Edwards’ hair as his jet idles on the 
tarmac. 
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Was Barbara’s journey to the airport in the carpool lane wrong?  An action 
is a material wrong if it interferes with another person’s use of her means, or if it 
constitutes an unauthorized use of another’s means.331  It is certainly possible to 
imagine circumstances under which Barbara’s use of the carpool lane involves 
wronging another individual.  For example, Barbara might enter the lane 
carelessly, thereby causing an accident, and we can (and will) debate the question 
of whether or not she wrongs another driver if her presence in the lane slows 
down traffic.  Nonetheless, her nominal violation of the carpool lane statute does 
not, in itself, amount to “wronging anyone else in particular.”332  It is possible to 
act as Barbara did without committing a material wrong against another person. 
If public roads were private property, Barbara’s use of the carpool lane 
would be trespass: an unauthorized use of another person’s real property.  
Ripstein appears to make an argument along these lines when he refers to the use 
of a public space in a manner inconsistent with the terms of laws of public 
provision as “a private appropriation of public space.”333  For example, Ripstein 
writes that a beggar, insofar as his activity violates the terms of any legislative 
enactments, “does wrong by appropriating public space for private purposes.”334  
A parking law violator likewise “claimed the public space for private purposes,” 
whether or not her violation hindered anyone’s ability to travel or park.335 
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Ripstein’s language about public spaces and private purposes may seem 
confusing at first, because we use the public roads for private purposes all the 
time.  Ripstein believes that the public purpose of the road is to preserve our 
independence by providing a means by which we can travel in order to associate 
with others.336  My activity of traveling on the road is a fulfillment of that 
purpose, but the state’s purpose does not need to be my purpose.337  Indeed, I 
may be traveling to a demonstration in favor of privatizing the public roads. 
The Veronese example from Chapter 2 may clarify Ripstein’s meaning.  
Recall that Romeo does not wrong Juliet (in the sense bearing on rights) if he 
cuddles her for the private purpose of making Rosaline jealous, so long as he tells 
no lies and Juliet agrees to be cuddled.338  However, Romeo does wrong Juliet if 
he cuddles her without her consent, even though she would have agreed to be 
cuddled had she been asked.339  This example demonstrated that two private 
parties to a rightful interaction must “share a purpose” in a very strong but very 
narrow sense.  They must have a “meeting of the minds”—and therefore 
something like a numerically identical purpose—regarding the terms of any 
rightful interaction itself.  However, the parties’ private purposes—what each may 
“hope to gain” from the interaction—need not be identical in any way.  Applying 
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this analytical approach to Barbara’s use of the public roads yields Ripstein’s 
result:  Barbara wrongs the state if she uses the public road in a manner which 
the people, through their laws, have not authorized.  So long as Barbara follows 
the rules, her private purposes need not be in any way identical with public ones. 
However, this analysis is inappropriate in the context of public spaces, 
because the state itself has no property rights.  Ripstein himself writes in a 
different context, “as Kant understands states, they do not have external objects 
of choice.”340  Recall the reason for this: independent adjudication by an 
authority is a constitutive element of a property right, and the state cannot 
coherently be subject to itself on equal terms with an individual subject in any 
dispute over property rights.341  When Kant describes the transition between a 
state of nature and a civil condition, he explains that the state can never be united 
with its own subjects under law: 
The civil union cannot itself be called a society, for between 
the commander and the subject there is no partnership.  
They are not fellow members: one is subordinated to, not 
coordinated with the other; and those who are coordinate 
with one another must for this very reason consider 
themselves equals since they are subject to common laws.  
The civil union is not so much a society but rather makes 
one.342 
The state cannot own property in the Kantian sense, because it cannot coherently 
be subject to its own laws of private right.343 
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The state’s means therefore do not consist of external objects of choice, but 
rather of the state’s three authorities—“the right of command” over the people.344  
For this reason, I think that Ripstein’s analysis does not show that the state was 
materially wronged by Barbara’s conduct.  Indeed, I believe that the state, 
because it has no acquired rights, cannot be materially wronged by its own 
subjects.345  All wrongs committed by subjects against the state within which they 
reside are formal wrongs. 
Are Regulatory Violations Necessarily Formal Wrongs? 
Barbara’s use of the carpool lane was not a formal wrong either.  On my 
proposed interpretation of the Universal Principle of Right, an action is formally 
wrong just in case the concept of a legal action on its maxim logically contradicts 
the concept of everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law (i.e. the 
concept of a rightful condition).  At first, it seems obvious that Barbara’s action is 
not a formal wrong by this standard.  Carpool lanes, useful though they might be, 
are not a constitutive element of a rightful condition.   
However, I must formulate Barbara’s maxim in order to apply my 
proposed standard, and doing so raises the question of how to handle the fact 
that Barbara knows that her action nominally violates the carpool lane statute.  
Barbara believes that by acting on her maxim, she will break the law.  Potentially 
relevant circumstances should be incorporated into any maxim evaluated under 
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my standard.  Barbara’s maxim should therefore be formulated:  “I will drive in 
the carpool lane, even though it is illegal, in order to earn money.”   
The concept of a legal action on Barbara’s maxim may appear at first to be 
self-contradictory, because an action cannot be legal and illegal simultaneously.  
However, I believe that this is a mistake.  In Chapter 3, I showed that the 
circumstances identified in an agent’s maxim for the purpose of determining 
formal wrongdoing are subjective beliefs, not facts about the external world.346  It 
is logically possible to perform a legal action while incorrectly believing it to be 
illegal.  The question in this case is whether the legality of an action on what I will 
call a “lawbreaking maxim”—one that incorporates a subjective belief that the 
action undertaken is illegal—would for that reason contradict the concept of a 
rightful condition.347 
I do not believe that the concept of a legal action on a maxim that reflects 
an agent’s subjective belief that her action violates the law contradicts the 
concept of a rightful condition for that reason.  To conclude otherwise would 
create a category of actions that are simultaneously wrong and obligatory, which 
is logically impossible.  For example, suppose that an unjust statute requires me 
to report the identities and locations of my Jewish neighbors to the police, so that 
any such neighbors can be arrested and deported.  Because I suffer from a flawed 
theory of law, I incorrectly believe that I have a legal obligation to report my 
neighbors.  Nonetheless, I am tempted to flout my perceived legal obligation 
because I love my neighbors and cannot bear the idea of causing them to suffer. 
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Which course of action open to me would be right?  I would materially 
wrong my neighbors if I voluntarily reported them to a government that intended 
to illegally deport them.  However, if my incorrect subjective belief that I am 
legally required to report my neighbors were enough to make my decision not to 
report them a formal wrong, then reporting them would also be obligatory.  For 
Kant, such a double bind is logically impossible: 
A conflict of duties would be a relations between them in 
which one of them would cancel the other (wholly or in part). 
–But since duty and obligation are concepts that express the 
objective practical necessity of certain actions and two rules 
opposed to each other cannot be necessary at the same time, 
if it is a duty to act in accordance with one rule, to act in 
accordance with the opposite rule is not a duty but even 
contrary to duty; so a collision of duties and obligations is 
inconceivable.348 
A subjective belief that an action is illegal therefore cannot suffice to make it the 
case that the action in question is formally wrong. 
However, there is an additional argument to be made for the proposition 
that Barbara’s action is formally wrong, which is of the same form as the 
argument I offered in Chapter 2 for the proposition that reckless endangerment is 
formally wrong.  Recall that an act of reckless endangerment is formally wrong 
because it intentionally puts others in grave danger of being materially 
wronged.349  Because grave danger of material wrongdoing is a part of the maxim 
on which a reckless party acts, the legality of an action on her maxim logically 
contradicts the concept of a rightful condition. 
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Barbara’s use of the carpool lane does not necessarily slow down traffic in 
that lane, which may be almost empty, but one might reasonably argue that the 
act of entering the carpool lane is extremely likely to cause traffic in that lane to 
slow down slightly in order to accommodate an additional vehicle, just as the act 
of driving blindfolded through town is extremely likely to injure pedestrians.  If 
this is correct, then entering the carpool lane is a formal wrong if other drivers in 
the lane would be materially wronged by being required to slow down.  It is a 
material wrong to interfere with another person’s use of her means, so long as 
that use is not itself wrongful.  Because the carpoolers are not doing anything 
wrong, the question is whether Barbara, by slowing down traffic, wrongfully 
interferes with their use of their own vehicles to get to their destinations. 
Ripstein draws a useful distinction, relevant here, between actions that 
interfere with others’ use of their means, and actions that merely change the 
environment in which others act.350  You have a right to go to the store to try to 
buy milk, but I do not wrongfully interfere with your activity if I arrive before you 
and purchase the last carton.  The reason I do not wrong you is because you don’t 
have a right to succeed in your effort; all you have a right to is the free use of your 
own means, which do not include—until and unless you are able to purchase 
one—a carton of milk.351  By beating you to the last carton, I have merely changed 
your environment in a way that you find inconvenient.   
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Applying this analysis to the carpool lane case would provide an easy 
answer if Barbara were driving in the lane with a companion.  A carpooler who 
generates slightly more traffic for those behind her is no different than a shopper 
who generates slightly more market demand for milk.  The critical question now 
appears to be whether Barbara’s solo carpool lane occupancy is different from 
this scenario in some way bearing on rights.  The argument that Barbara’s action 
wrongs other drivers must go something like this:  we each have a right to use our 
own vehicles to travel on the public roads in the manner prescribed by law.  
Among lawful drivers, first-come-first-serve is unobjectionable, but Barbara is 
helping herself to a freedom prohibited to others.  In doing so, she wrongly 
interferes with other drivers’ use of their vehicles to get to their destinations on 
the public roads.   
Indeed, Ripstein appears to make an argument along these lines.  
Comparing a traffic violation to a private contract violation, Ripstein writes, “the 
‘free rider’ wrongs his fellow citizens by taking advantage of their efforts.”352  He 
also writes: 
In the context of mandatory social cooperation, if you do 
your part but others do not do theirs, they have treated you 
as a mere means, because you have contributed to the 
achievement of their purposes.  You set out to do your part; 
rather than doing theirs, they took advantage of your 
efforts.353 
I believe that arguments of this type beg the very question at issue in this chapter:  
how we ought to interpret laws of public provision.  If we interpret laws of public 
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provision as obligatory laws, then Barbara is a wrongdoer, because she makes 
herself an exception to a law that she is rationally required to endorse for others.  
If we interpret laws of public provision as permissive laws, then Barbara is 
traveling on the public roads “in the manner prescribed by law,” and Ripstein’s 
objection does not apply to her. 
I believe that a concern for the universality of the law is at the heart of this 
kind of objection.  I also believe that universality is precisely the property of law 
that makes it the case that laws imposing only fines on nominal violators must be 
interpreted as permissive laws.  In order to obligate us, a statute must establish a 
universal external incentive for compliance—a punishment that every person is 
rationally required to avoid by complying with the law.  Because the statute that 
Barbara nominally violated did not provide such an incentive, Barbara’s action 
was both lawful and rightful, though not particularly virtuous. 
Of course, not every law that imposes a fine is necessarily free of formal 
defects.  A law that imposes a fine on something we have a preexisting right to do 
may infringe on our freedom if it prevents the exercise of our rights or if it is 
unrelated to any public cost associated with the fined conduct.  For example, it 
would probably be impermissible to charge a special tax on those who exercise 
the right to pray.  Similarly, as Ripstein argues, our external freedom may include 
a right to travel on public roads in order to freely associate.  If he is correct, a fee 
charged for the mere right to travel on the public roadways could be inconsistent 
with our freedom, especially if it contained no exception for those who could not 
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afford to pay it.  Fines can also violate the principle of equality under the law by 
charging some individuals more than others without any reasonable basis.  In 
light of my finding that such laws should be considered permissive rather than 
obligatory in nature, these questions should prove fruitful avenues for additional 
inquiry.
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Conclusion 
This project has endeavored to provide a Kantian philosophical framework 
for understanding our individual obligations under public law.  We are all 
rationally required to value our external freedom, and the state is therefore 
authorized to establish and enforce coercive laws for the purpose of securing the 
greatest equal freedom that is possible for us.  Because we have a right to do 
anything that is not wrong, I have offered an interpretation of Kant’s Universal 
Principle of Right that tracks the two ways—material and formal—in which 
actions can be wrong.  My interpretation yields some surprising insights, most 
notably a novel formulation of Kant’s standard for formal wrongdoing, which 
establishes that the wrong-making property of a formally wrong action does not 
depend on whether or not the action in question has been prohibited by statute.  I 
infer from this a natural law theory of public crime: only if an action is already 
formally wrong can it be justly prohibited by the state. 
I also developed a Kantian theory of the prerequisites for legal obligation.  
In order to obligate us, a legal prohibition must include a universal external 
incentive to comply with the law in the form of a criminal punishment.  Fines 
cannot serve as the required universal external incentive, because they can never 
generate a rational requirement to obey a law.  It follows that otherwise just 
enactments that impose only fines on nominal violators should be understood as 
rightful permissive laws, according to which we may incur liabilities through our 
voluntary choices. 
  135 
While this project covers a great deal of ground, it also raises many 
additional questions, which I hope will be fruitful avenues for future research.    I 
have not yet explored in detail the manner in which my formulation of Kant’s 
standard for formal wrongdoing might be applied to actual criminal statutes in 
order to determine whether they have lawful authority.  I also have not yet 
explored in detail how permissive laws must be structured and administered in 
order to be consistent with the principle of equality.  For example, does imperfect 
or intermittent enforcement of fines associated with permissive laws amount to 
an objectionably arbitrary application of the law?  What fine-avoidance activities 
on the part of subjects are permissible, and which are morally or legally 
objectionable?  When do fines impermissibly burden liberty rights that we may 
have to access public spaces such as roads?  A research program that answers 
these and other questions will develop a richer theory of Kantian permissive law. 
